Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers

IF 1 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW University of Illinois Law Review Pub Date : 2002-06-21 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.316639
N. Moore
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Ethical issues arise frequently in class action litigation. These issues include conflicts of interest, solicitation, application of the no-contact rule, the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, and the attorney-witness rule. There has been considerable difficulty applying existing rules of conduct to these situations, partly because of confusion regarding the relationship among class counsel, the named class representatives and absent members of the class. Thus as to conflicts of interest - perhaps the most pressing problem facing class action lawyers - it has been said that a "strict reading of the conflict of interest rules in class actions should be tempered, because the very nature of a class action is to combine many divergent interests." Despite the frequency with which the propriety of lawyers' conduct is litigated in class action lawsuits, the Ethics 2000 Commission - which recently proposed comprehensive amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct - declined either to adopt a separate class action rule or to add extensive commentary addressing the application of the rules to class action lawsuits. The purpose of this article is to explain and defend the Commission's decision, focusing on the issue that dominates many discussions of ethics and class actions - the difficulty of applying current conflict-of-interest rules to the myriad of conflicting interests that commonly arise in these lawsuits, including conflicts among class members, as well as between the lawyer and the class and between the class and third persons. Parts I and II of the article demonstrate that the scope of the problem is not nearly as large as it is commonly thought to be. Part I argues that the class should be viewed as an entity client, in which case it becomes clear that conflict of interest rules simply do not apply to conflicts within a class. Part II eliminates from consideration those conflicts - like conflicts arising from the size of the lawyer's fee - that are not addressed by conflict-of-interest doctrine because they are not unique to particular lawyers but are rather a type of agency problem that is endemic to legal practice. Parts III and IV of the article then turn to the types of conflicts that would be addressed by a "strict reading" of the conflict-of-interest rules. These conflicts include those arising from the lawyer's duties to other current clients, both inside and outside the class, as well as former clients. Part III argues that from the point of view of the non-class client, there is no reason to relax the current conflict rules. These clients are entitled to full disclosure of the conflict and an opportunity to find independent counsel. Part IV addresses these conflicts from the point of view of the class itself. Here it is argued that relaxation (or special application) of the conflict rules may be warranted in some cases, but that it makes sense to leave these issues to be resolved under class action law - under the rubric of a further elaboration of the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - rather than by amendments to the rules of professional conduct.
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谁来监管集体诉讼律师
集体诉讼中经常出现道德问题。这些问题包括利益冲突、招揽、非接触规则的适用、律师费的合理性以及律师-证人规则。将现有的行为规则应用于这些情况是相当困难的,部分原因是对集体律师、指定的班级代表和缺席的班级成员之间的关系感到困惑。因此,对于利益冲突——也许是集体诉讼律师面临的最紧迫的问题——有人说,“应该缓和对集体诉讼中利益冲突规则的严格解读,因为集体诉讼的本质是将许多不同的利益结合在一起。”尽管律师行为的适当性在集体诉讼中被提起诉讼的频率很高,但道德2000委员会——最近提出了对美国律师协会职业行为示范规则的全面修订——既拒绝采用单独的集体诉讼规则,也拒绝对规则在集体诉讼中的应用进行广泛的评论。本文的目的是解释和捍卫委员会的决定,重点关注主导许多道德和集体诉讼讨论的问题-将当前的利益冲突规则应用于这些诉讼中常见的无数利益冲突的困难,包括集体成员之间的冲突,以及律师与集体之间以及集体与第三人之间的冲突。本文的第一部分和第二部分表明,问题的范围并不像通常认为的那么大。第一部分认为,类应该被视为实体客户端,在这种情况下,很明显,利益冲突规则根本不适用于类内部的冲突。第二部分从考虑中排除了那些冲突——比如由律师费的大小引起的冲突——这些冲突没有被利益冲突理论所解决,因为它们不是特定律师所特有的,而是法律实践中特有的一种代理问题。然后,文章的第三和第四部分转向将通过“严格解读”利益冲突规则来解决的冲突类型。这些冲突包括律师对班级内外的其他现有客户以及以前的客户的职责所产生的冲突。第三部分认为,从非类别委托人的角度来看,没有理由放松现行的冲突规则。这些客户有权全面披露冲突并有机会找到独立律师。第四部分从阶级本身的角度阐述了这些冲突。在这里,有人认为,在某些情况下,可能有必要放宽(或特别适用)冲突规则,但让这些问题在集体诉讼法下解决是有意义的- -在进一步阐述《联邦民事诉讼规则》第23条的充分代表要求的标题下- -而不是通过修订专业行为规则。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
9.10%
发文量
1
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