Brain-Machine Interfaces and Personal Responsibility for Action - Maybe Not As Complicated After All

S. Holm, T. Voo
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

This comment responds to Kevin Warwick’s article on predictability and responsibility with respect to brain-machine interfaces (BMI) in action. It compares conventional responsibility for device use with the potential consequences of phenomenological human-machine integration which obscures the causal chain of an act. It explores two senses of “responsibility”: 1) when it is attributed to a person, suggesting the morally important way in which the person is a causal agent, and 2) when a person is accountable and, on the basis of fairness about rewards and sanctions, has a duty to act responsibly and accept liability. The comment suggests that, in the absence of absolute knowledge and predictability, we continue to engage in practical forms of reasoning about the responsibility for BMI-use in ways which are inclusive of uncertainties about the liability of persons versus devices and those who create them.
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脑机接口和个人行为责任——也许并没有那么复杂
这篇评论是对Kevin Warwick关于脑机接口(BMI)的可预测性和责任的文章的回应。它比较了设备使用的传统责任与现象学人机集成的潜在后果,后者模糊了行为的因果链。它探讨了“责任”的两种含义:1)当责任被归因于一个人时,表明这个人在道德上是一个重要的因果行为主体;2)当一个人是负责任的,并且在公平奖惩的基础上,有责任采取负责任的行动并承担责任。该评论表明,在缺乏绝对知识和可预测性的情况下,我们继续以实际形式对使用bmi的责任进行推理,其中包括人与设备及其创造者之间责任的不确定性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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