Strategic Corporate Tax Lobbying

IF 1.3 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of the American Taxation Association Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI:10.2308/ATAX-51043
Janet A. Meade, Shihong Li
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引用次数: 23

Abstract

ABSTRACT: We investigate the motivation for and outcome of corporate participation in shaping tax policy via lobbying. We posit that generally tax-sophisticated firms lobby on tax issues and that their motives for doing so are either to obtain a tax benefit or to avoid losing one. We label these motives as strategic and defensive tax lobbying, respectively, and we empirically investigate whether strategic lobbying yields a measurable reduction in future tax rates. Using a proxy measure of strategic tax lobbying, we find a significant and negative relation between our measure and future cash ETRs. Alternative specifications of our primary model produce similar results.
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策略性的企业税收游说
摘要:本文研究了企业通过游说参与税收政策制定的动机和结果。我们假设,通常精通税务的公司就税务问题进行游说,他们这样做的动机要么是为了获得税收优惠,要么是为了避免失去税收优惠。我们将这些动机分别标记为战略性和防御性税收游说,并实证研究了战略性游说是否会产生可衡量的未来税率降低。使用战略税收游说的代理度量,我们发现我们的度量与未来现金ETRs之间存在显著的负相关关系。我们的主要模型的其他规范产生类似的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
12.50%
发文量
14
期刊最新文献
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