{"title":"Avoiding Slipko’s Slips: Karol Wojtyla’s Two Levels of Value","authors":"Thomas Lahay","doi":"10.26385/SG.080324","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"the moral fact that adultery has a negative moral value and is morally bad by examining the positive attribute of marital fidelity. Aquinas used remotion to show how we can understand God from what he is not. There is no reason why Wojtyła should be held to the standard that Ślipko is claiming. The Decalogue contains many “thou shall not” statements which point back to the moral norm. It would be hard to see how someone would be able to make any headway starting from these well-known examples unless we use abstraction in this same sense that Wojtyła and Aquinas have used it in remotion. In fact Ślipko later suggests this himself. Nonetheless, Wojtyła is not looking for the kind of abstraction that Ślipko is advocating. The difference between intellectual virtues and moral virtues is that the intellectual virtues are aimed at the speculative and the moral virtues are aimed at practical matters of action. Hence, the moral virtues are concerned with means as Aristotle notes. The kind of abstraction required has an aim to lay hold of the facts and recognize things for what they are, not describe what they are or to create new categories. This is why conscience is not described as a method for deriving knowledge but referred to by Aquinas as a kind of practical or particular syllogism known as synderesis. As Wojtyła notes, “the theory of morality develops not just as a certain abstraction in relation to the living, and existential reality of human morality . . . it goes straight to the dynamic core of moral facts and 44 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Hanover House, 1955–1957), I, 14: “Now, in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. For, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable To apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able To have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.” Available online—see the section References for details. 45 Ślipko, “Concept of Value,” 23. 46 Thomas Aquinas, “On Conscience,” in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998), 226–227.","PeriodicalId":36983,"journal":{"name":"Studia Gilsoniana","volume":"8 1","pages":"621-643"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studia Gilsoniana","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26385/SG.080324","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
the moral fact that adultery has a negative moral value and is morally bad by examining the positive attribute of marital fidelity. Aquinas used remotion to show how we can understand God from what he is not. There is no reason why Wojtyła should be held to the standard that Ślipko is claiming. The Decalogue contains many “thou shall not” statements which point back to the moral norm. It would be hard to see how someone would be able to make any headway starting from these well-known examples unless we use abstraction in this same sense that Wojtyła and Aquinas have used it in remotion. In fact Ślipko later suggests this himself. Nonetheless, Wojtyła is not looking for the kind of abstraction that Ślipko is advocating. The difference between intellectual virtues and moral virtues is that the intellectual virtues are aimed at the speculative and the moral virtues are aimed at practical matters of action. Hence, the moral virtues are concerned with means as Aristotle notes. The kind of abstraction required has an aim to lay hold of the facts and recognize things for what they are, not describe what they are or to create new categories. This is why conscience is not described as a method for deriving knowledge but referred to by Aquinas as a kind of practical or particular syllogism known as synderesis. As Wojtyła notes, “the theory of morality develops not just as a certain abstraction in relation to the living, and existential reality of human morality . . . it goes straight to the dynamic core of moral facts and 44 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Hanover House, 1955–1957), I, 14: “Now, in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. For, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable To apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able To have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.” Available online—see the section References for details. 45 Ślipko, “Concept of Value,” 23. 46 Thomas Aquinas, “On Conscience,” in Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998), 226–227.
通过考察婚姻忠诚的积极属性,揭示通奸具有消极的道德价值和道德败坏的道德事实。阿奎那用情感来说明我们如何从上帝的非性中理解他。没有理由认为Wojtyła应该符合Ślipko所宣称的标准。十诫包含许多“你不可”的陈述,这些陈述指向道德规范。如果我们不像Wojtyła和阿奎那那样使用抽象,就很难看出有人能够从这些众所周知的例子中取得任何进展。事实上Ślipko后来自己也暗示了这一点。尽管如此,Wojtyła并不是在寻找Ślipko所提倡的那种抽象。智力美德和道德美德的区别在于智力美德的目标是思辨而道德美德的目标是行动的实际问题。因此,正如亚里士多德所指出的,道德美德与手段有关。所需要的这种抽象的目的是掌握事实,认识事物的本来面目,而不是描述它们是什么,或者创造新的范畴。这就是为什么良心没有被描述为一种获得知识的方法,而是被阿奎那称为一种实践的或特殊的三段论,称为联合论。正如Wojtyła所指出的那样,“道德理论的发展不仅仅是作为与人类道德的生活和存在的现实有关的某种抽象……它直接触及道德事实的动态核心,44见托马斯·阿奎那,《外邦人的反总论》,译。Anton C. Pegis(纽约:Hanover House, 1955-1957), I, 14:“现在,在考虑神圣的实体时,我们应该特别使用移动的方法。因为,由于它的无限,神圣的物质超越了我们的智力所能达到的一切形式。因此,我们无法通过知道它是什么来理解它。然而我们知道它不是什么,就能对它有所了解。”可在线获得,详情请参阅参考资料部分。45 Ślipko,“价值概念”,23。46托马斯·阿奎那,《论良心》,载于《托马斯·阿奎那文集》,译。拉尔夫·麦金纳尼(纽约:企鹅出版社,1998),226-227页。