{"title":"Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest","authors":"Timothy K. Armstrong","doi":"10.31219/osf.io/25qpy","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Judicial review of a federal administrative agency's statutory or regulatory interpretation ordinarily proceeds under the highly deferential framework announced in the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Withholding an independent judicial interpretation of a statute or regulation in deference to an agency's views, however, poses unique problems when the agency has a self-interested stake in its interpretation - as, for example, when the agency's interpretation affects its regulatory jurisdiction or yields a financial benefit to the agency. A review of several cases in which courts have deferred, or refused to defer, to interpretations of law that implicated the self-interest of the issuing agency shows that the courts have not enunciated a consistent rationale to explain their divergent results. The article concludes that extending the Chevron deference principle to self-interested agency interpretations of law conflicts with settled norms of due process, and proposes an alternative analytical framework for judicial review of such interpretations.","PeriodicalId":39833,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","volume":"13 1","pages":"203-288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"13","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/25qpy","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Abstract
Judicial review of a federal administrative agency's statutory or regulatory interpretation ordinarily proceeds under the highly deferential framework announced in the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Withholding an independent judicial interpretation of a statute or regulation in deference to an agency's views, however, poses unique problems when the agency has a self-interested stake in its interpretation - as, for example, when the agency's interpretation affects its regulatory jurisdiction or yields a financial benefit to the agency. A review of several cases in which courts have deferred, or refused to defer, to interpretations of law that implicated the self-interest of the issuing agency shows that the courts have not enunciated a consistent rationale to explain their divergent results. The article concludes that extending the Chevron deference principle to self-interested agency interpretations of law conflicts with settled norms of due process, and proposes an alternative analytical framework for judicial review of such interpretations.
对联邦行政机构的法定或监管解释的司法审查通常在具有里程碑意义的雪佛龙美国公司诉自然资源保护委员会案(467 U.S. 837(1984))中宣布的高度尊重的框架下进行。然而,当该机构在其解释中具有自身利益利益时——例如,当该机构的解释影响其监管管辖权或为该机构带来经济利益时——拒绝对法规或法规作出独立的司法解释,就会产生独特的问题。对法院推迟或拒绝推迟对涉及发布机构自身利益的法律解释的几个案件的审查表明,法院没有阐明一致的理由来解释其不同的结果。本文的结论是,将雪佛龙服从原则扩展到自利机构对法律的解释与既定的正当程序规范相冲突,并提出了对此类解释的司法审查的另一种分析框架。
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1991, the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy (JLPP) has quickly risen to become one of the leading public policy journals in the nation. A fixture among the top 10 policy journals, JLPP has consistently been among the top 100 student-edited law journals. JLPP publishes articles, student notes, essays, book reviews, and other scholarly works that examine the intersections of compelling public or social policy issues and the law. As a journal of law and policy, we are a publication that not only analyzes the law but also seeks to impact its development.