Examining the "Species" of Situated Cognition in Humans

Abstract

In the target article “Cognition Beyond Representation: Varieties of Situated Cognition in Animals,” Ken Cheng describes situated cognition as a “genus” of ideas and effects whereby cognition extends beyond the central nervous system of an organism to include its peripheral nervous system and/or the environment. Although Cheng’s article focuses specifically on nonhuman animals, here we apply his definitions of four “species” of situated cognition to find examples in humans. We highlight the ways in which each of distributed (e.g., a crew flying an airplane), embodied (e.g., computation in peripheral sense organs), extended (e.g., extensions of peripersonal space), and enactive (e.g., decision making reflected in movement) cognition are seen in humans. In doing so, we provide evidence for Cheng’s major hypothesis that cognition is not confined solely to the central nervous system and that this may be a fundamental principle of cognition across animal organisms.