What If ... "China Attacks Taiwan!"

Q3 Arts and Humanities Parameters Pub Date : 2001-09-22 DOI:10.4324/9780203087411
R. Russell
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

"The Lacedaemonians gave sentence that the peace was broken and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase. For they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands." Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War "Attack when they are unprepared, make your move when they do not expect it." "So a military force is established by deception, mobilized by gain, and adapted by division and combination." Sun Tzu, The Art of War In surveying the landscape of international politics, the Taiwan Strait stands out as an area with grave potential for seismic instability. Beijing argues that Taiwan remains a province of China, while Taiwan steadily establishes de facto independence and contemplates the formal announcement of national autonomy. Such a declaration would cross China's political "red line" and push Beijing to the use of force. The United States, meanwhile, clings to a policy of "strategic ambiguity," recognizing only one China, with diplomatic ties to Beijing and withholding diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. The United States argues that any Chinese military aggression against Taiwan would be a serious threat to American interests, but so far has stopped short of extending formal security guarantees to Taiwan, fearing that such agreements would embolden Taiwan to formally declare independence and trigger a conflict with China. The Bush Administration does appear to be edging toward a more assertive position in support of Ta iwan than was the case during the Clinton era, however. President Bush in April 2001 publicly stated that the United States would do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. [1] Despite the intractable political dilemma, many commentators and observers dismiss the potential for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They argue that China's public comments on reserving the right to use force to cut the Gordian knot amounts to little more than bluff and bluster because China will lack the military means to attack and occupy Taiwan for at least ten years. This confident assessment lends itself to the United States resting comfortably on its current policy position of strategic ambiguity and dismissing the potential for a military conflagration in the Taiwan Strait that could bring American and Chinese forces into direct combat. What if the prescience of these analysts is less than perfect? This article constructs a devil's advocate analysis to weigh against the analyses that see little prospect for major Chinese military action against Taiwan. It suggests that the Chinese could use strategic surprise to compensate for shortcomings in military capabilities and orchestrate a successful military campaign to take control of Taiwan. The Chinese could do so by readily deceiving outside observers about the scope of their sealift and airlift capabilities, which would fundamentally undermine the linchpin assumptions of sanguine analyses about Chinese force projection capabilities. The Chinese also could use massive barrages of surface-to-surface missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction to profoundly disrupt Taiwan's air force, air defenses, and other measures to counter Chinese amphibious and airborne assaults in a coordinated campaign to occupy Taiwan. What the Chinese military lacks in technological sophistication could be compensa ted for in military mass, contrary to the assertions of the optimists. This sort of devil's advocate analysis has significant implications for US policy. American policymakers can better protect national interests if policy and military options are thought through long before the outbreak of a cross-Strait conflict than if they wait and are caught off-guard by a Chinese surprise attack. Surprise Attack and Deception Surprise attack is the use of military force against an unsuspecting and ill-prepared adversary. …
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如果……“中国攻击台湾!”
拉塞代蒙尼亚人宣判和平被打破,战争即将爆发,与其说是因为同盟的言辞,不如说是因为担心雅典的强大会继续增强。因为他们看见希腊的一大半已经落在他们手里了。”修昔底德,《伯罗奔尼撒战争》“趁他们毫无准备时进攻,趁他们毫无准备时采取行动。”“因此,一支军队是靠欺骗建立起来的,靠胜利动员起来的,靠分裂和联合来适应的。”纵观国际政治格局,台湾海峡是一个极有可能发生地震的地区。北京方面辩称,台湾仍是中国的一个省,而台湾则稳步确立事实上的独立,并考虑正式宣布民族自治。这样的声明将越过中国的政治“红线”,迫使北京方面使用武力。与此同时,美国坚持“战略模糊”政策,只承认一个中国,与北京建立外交关系,拒绝与台湾建交。美国认为,中国对台湾的任何军事侵略都将严重威胁到美国的利益,但到目前为止还没有向台湾提供正式的安全保证,担心这样的协议会鼓励台湾正式宣布独立,引发与中国的冲突。不过,布什政府在支持台湾问题上的立场似乎确实比克林顿时期更加强硬。尽管存在棘手的政治困境,但许多评论员和观察人士都不认为中国大陆有可能入侵台湾。他们认为,中国公开表示保留使用武力解决棘手问题的权利,不过是虚张声势,因为中国至少在10年内将缺乏进攻和占领台湾的军事手段。这种自信的评估使美国能够安于其目前战略模糊的政策立场,并忽视了台湾海峡军事冲突的可能性,这种冲突可能会使美国和中国军队直接交战。如果这些分析师的先见之明不够完美呢?本文构建了一个唱反调的分析来权衡那些认为中国对台湾采取重大军事行动前景渺茫的分析。这表明,中国可以利用战略突袭来弥补军事能力上的不足,并精心策划一场成功的军事行动,以控制台湾。中国可以通过轻易地欺骗外界观察人士,让他们了解其海上和空中运输能力的范围,这将从根本上破坏对中国军力投送能力的乐观分析的关键假设。中国还可以使用大规模地对地导弹和大规模杀伤性武器来严重破坏台湾的空军、防空系统和其他措施,以对抗中国的两栖和空中攻击,以协调占领台湾。与乐观主义者的断言相反,中国军队在技术上的不足可以通过大规模的军事力量来弥补。这种唱反调的分析对美国的政策有重大影响。如果在两岸冲突爆发之前就考虑好政策和军事选择,美国决策者就能更好地保护国家利益,而不是坐等中国的突然袭击而措手不及。奇袭是指对毫无防备和准备不足的对手使用军事力量。…
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Parameters Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
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