The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

Abstract

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. By Geoffrey Wawro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 327 pages. $35.00. Reviewed by Dr. Eugenia C. Kiesling, Professor of History, US Military Academy. For 40 years, no historian has dared to risk comparison with Michael Howard's Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 by publishing an English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War. Professor Geoffrey Wawro is not only brave but has succeeded in producing, if not a replacement for Howard, a worthy companion volume. Even more than Howard's book, this is straightforward military history, a study of armies and battles with little discussion of national policy, and with no concern for the economic or other domestic aspects of the war. As such, it is a useful work. The Franco-Prussian War was a military proving ground in an age full of uncertainties. French long-service professionals fought against Prussian conscripts, Chassepot rifles and Mitrailleuse machine guns against the Dreyse needle gun, Krupp's new steel breech-loading six-pounder gun against the French army's four-pounder bronze muzzle-loaders, an efficient general staff against a poor one. No one knew how these various contests would turn out, and Wawro offers an enthralling narrative of how battles were won and lost. As such, it ought to be of great interest to the professional soldier as well as the military historian. In introducing the two armies, Wawro touches only briefly on the fairly well-understood subject of contemporary technological developments and their impact on military tactics. That decision reflects a reasonable economy of force, especially as the necessary points are clearly illustrated in the battle narratives. More problematic is the absence of discussion of the technology's effects at the operational and strategic levels of war. For example, because Wawro says little about railroads, readers unfamiliar with the subject may fail to recognize the technological background to General Helmut von Moltke's prediction for battles of encirclement. One advantage of being the second person to write on a given war is there is no historiography to bother about. Wawro's book is all the more readable for the absence of arguments with other historians. On the other hand, a historiographical discussion would have had the salutary effect of forcing Wawro to take more rigorous positions on certain points of controversy. In particular, Wawro does not situate himself vis-a-vis the triumphalist school of German military history, which sees the Prussian army of 1870 as a model of inexorable efficiency, the precursor of the Wehrmacht of the early years of World War II. If one believes this theory, Germans rolled over France in 1870 and 1940 (and almost in 1914) because their army was overwhelmingly superior in quality of soldiers, leadership, doctrine, organization, and use of technology. This school emphasizes the German General Staff system and an aggressive approach to war characterized by doctrines like auftragstaktik and operational art. In the early pages, Wawro appears to belong in the triumphalist camp. His chapter on "The Armies in 1870" compares the "sins of the French army" with a Prussian war-planning marked by "theoretical and technical innovations." He invidiously compares French methods, orderly but slow and rigid, with auftragstaktik, purposeful energy behind the appearance of disorder. But the operation narrative refers to auftragstaktik and operational art too rarely to demonstrate the importance of these concepts to the German victory. For example, the claim that operational art "dictated" a particular action begs the question of defining operational art and explaining how a doctrine enforces its will on armies. …