Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945

Abstract

Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945 by Mark Clodfelter Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2011 392pages $40.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] "It is a strange title: "beneficial" and "bombing" are not words that seem likely to appear in close proximity to one another. How, a reader might ask, can the concussive, explosive, and incendiary effects of aerial bombing-s40.00 including the splintering of infrastructure, the destruction of dwellings, and the loss of human life, sometimes on a vast scale--be considered "beneficial"? Author Mark Clodfelter contends that US advocates of aerial bombing, reacting to the great battlefront slaughter of World War I, offered an alternative form of war that would lead to quicker-and thus more humane--resolution to conflict. Clodfelter argues that the carnage and waste of the Western Front "sparked the beginning of a progressive effort that was unique--an attempt to reform war by relying on its own destructive technology as the instrument of change." The airplane "offered the means to make wars much less lethal than conflicts waged by armies or navies." He contends that the American contribution to this general idea was the envisioning of a precision bombing campaign based on sophisticated technology: "The finite destruction would end wars quickly, without crippling manpower losses--maximum results with a minimum of death--and thus, bombing would actually serve as a beneficial instrument of war." The author is by no means the first to describe and explain the origins of American faith in "precision" bombing, and the "industrial fabric theory of war"; these have been the subject of extensive work by such authors as Conrad Crane, Richard Davis, Michael Sherry, Donald Miller, and others. But Clodfelter adds a new twist, arguing that the views of American airmen were rooted in the progressive tradition that, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, had influenced American political and social behavior, and driven the reforms advocated by Theodore Roosevelt and others. The author does not, however, offer a robust description of what the progressive movement was, or precisely why or how it would have such a dominant impact on American airmen. Sometimes the author equates "progressive rhetoric" with the idea that bombing would shorten wars; sometimes he links it to the more specific notion of the precision bombing of key industrial targets. Reviewing the book proved frustrating for this reviewer; while not convinced by the thesis, I nonetheless found the history itself to be informative, engaging, and well-articulated. The author writes well; in particular he has a marvelous ability to sketch characters on the page, bringing them to life with just a few deft brushstrokes. And the book is based principally on primary source material, making it rich in detail and illuminating. Clodfelter adds texture and insight to our knowledge of an important topic. And, in his final chapter, the author includes an intelligent and perceptive critique of contemporary United Sates Air Force (USAF) doctrine. Aside from its rather sweeping and shaky theoretical claim, the book is certainly a worthy contribution to the literature. To really test the author's thesis, though, we need to look outside of the United States. Many non-Americans embraced the idea that long-range bombing would create a dramatic change in the nature of warfare and would hold the potential to deter or shorten wars. Guilio Douhet, an Italian modernist and technological determinist, was an early and vocal advocate of the idea that bombing would shorten wars. Air war, he claimed, would be so terrible that it would be, ultimately, more merciful. And Sir Arthur Harris, head of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Bomber Command from 1942 to 1945, became the strongest and most persistent air advocate of his generation; he insisted to the end of his life that long-range bombing was the preferable alternative to bloody land warfare, and that, indeed, an Anglo-American ground campaign in World War II would have been unnecessary had he been given more latitude to fight the air war as he had seen fit. …