{"title":"Tax Morale with Partisan Parties","authors":"Ángel Solano-García","doi":"10.7866/hpe-rpe.15.2.4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stage-model where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We model political competition a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibri¬um. We calibrate the model for an average of EU-27 countries. Numerical simulations provide the tax rates proposed by the two parties and the level of tax compliance. We find that a decrease in the per¬ceived average level of tax compliance, increase the probability that the party offering the lowest in¬come tax will win. Moreover, the same result is obtained when parties’ uncertainty about the prefer¬ences of the median voter increases","PeriodicalId":48669,"journal":{"name":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","volume":"213 1","pages":"83-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hacienda Publica Espanola-Review of Public Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7866/hpe-rpe.15.2.4","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stage-model where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We model political competition a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibri¬um. We calibrate the model for an average of EU-27 countries. Numerical simulations provide the tax rates proposed by the two parties and the level of tax compliance. We find that a decrease in the per¬ceived average level of tax compliance, increase the probability that the party offering the lowest in¬come tax will win. Moreover, the same result is obtained when parties’ uncertainty about the prefer¬ences of the median voter increases
期刊介绍：
Hacienda Pública Española/Review of Public Economics welcomes submissions on all areas of public economics. We seek to publish original and innovative research, applied and theoretical, related to the economic analysis of Government intervention. For example, but not exclusively: Taxation, Redistribution, Health, Education, Pensions, Governance, Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Federalism.
In addition to regular submissions, the journal welcomes submissions of:
-Survey Reviews, containing surveys of the literature regarding issues of interest in the Public Economics field;
-Policy oriented reviews, showing the current contributions of Public Economics in relation to relevant contemporary issues affecting public decision-makers in the real world (Policy Watch);
-Comments of previously published articles. Contributions to this section should be limited to a maximum of 2 000 words (12 pages). If deemed adequate, the authors of the commented article will be given the opportunity to react in a Reply. Both Comment and Reply will be published together.
Articles for the Survey Reviews and Policy Watch section are subject to the same double blind reviwing procedure. The adequacy of Comments submitted for publication will be evaluated by the Executive Editors.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
