{"title":"Ex Ante and Ex Post Control over Courts in the US States: Court Curbing and Political Party Influence","authors":"M. Catalano","doi":"10.1080/0098261X.2022.2123287","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Court curbing, proposed policy that attempts to “restrict, remove or otherwise limit” the power of the judiciary, occurs regularly and with considerable variation throughout the US states. I deviate from past studies, which consider court curbing as an ex post control mechanism, by focusing on ex ante controls of state courts – judicial selection rules and processes. I argue that levels of political party influence over judicial selection (before a judge is seated) alter the motivation to engage in court curbing after a judge is seated. I test this novel ex ante explanation with an original data set of court curbing and judicial selection from 2015 to 2018. Mixed results offer some support for my theory while opening new opportunities for study, particularly among partisan election systems.","PeriodicalId":45509,"journal":{"name":"Justice System Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Justice System Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2022.2123287","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Abstract Court curbing, proposed policy that attempts to “restrict, remove or otherwise limit” the power of the judiciary, occurs regularly and with considerable variation throughout the US states. I deviate from past studies, which consider court curbing as an ex post control mechanism, by focusing on ex ante controls of state courts – judicial selection rules and processes. I argue that levels of political party influence over judicial selection (before a judge is seated) alter the motivation to engage in court curbing after a judge is seated. I test this novel ex ante explanation with an original data set of court curbing and judicial selection from 2015 to 2018. Mixed results offer some support for my theory while opening new opportunities for study, particularly among partisan election systems.
期刊介绍：
The Justice System Journal is an interdisciplinary journal that publishes original research articles on all aspects of law, courts, court administration, judicial behavior, and the impact of all of these on public and social policy. Open as to methodological approaches, The Justice System Journal aims to use the latest in advanced social science research and analysis to bridge the gap between practicing and academic law, courts and politics communities. The Justice System Journal invites submission of original articles and research notes that are likely to be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of law, courts, and judicial administration, broadly defined. Articles may draw on a variety of research approaches in the social sciences. The journal does not publish articles devoted to extended analysis of legal doctrine such as a law review might publish, although short manuscripts analyzing cases or legal issues are welcome and will be considered for the Legal Notes section. The Justice System Journal was created in 1974 by the Institute for Court Management and is published under the auspices of the National Center for State Courts. The Justice System Journal features peer-reviewed research articles as well as reviews of important books in law and courts, and analytical research notes on some of the leading cases from state and federal courts. The journal periodically produces special issues that provide analysis of fundamental and timely issues on law and courts from both national and international perspectives.
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