{"title":"Buyers’ Cartels: Prevalence and Undercharges","authors":"J. Connor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3883691","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels comprise less than 8 percent of the total, that they are clustered in primary-products and services industries, that they employ bid rigging conduct to a greater extent than sellers’ cartels, and that undercharges average close to 20 percent of the but-for price. These quantitative characteristics are supplemented by sketches of the conduct and prosecutions of a few of the better-documented cases of buyers’ cartels.","PeriodicalId":11837,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","volume":"235 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other IO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3883691","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels comprise less than 8 percent of the total, that they are clustered in primary-products and services industries, that they employ bid rigging conduct to a greater extent than sellers’ cartels, and that undercharges average close to 20 percent of the but-for price. These quantitative characteristics are supplemented by sketches of the conduct and prosecutions of a few of the better-documented cases of buyers’ cartels.