{"title":"Pre-electoral fiscal policies and opportunistic spending: the case of the recently decentralised Macedonian local governments","authors":"Ljubinka Andonoska","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2122043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between local elections and local government budgets. Using dataset of all Macedonian municipalities for the period 2007-2015, this study examines whether the overall spending and the composition of local government expenditures are systematically manipulated just before elections. The results show that spending during the pre-election period shifts toward more desirable categories such as permanent and temporary employment, capital projects, and individual transfers and subsidies. Very few studies relate pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to clientelistic linkages. This paper fills the void by adding empirical evidence from a transitional democracy.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"East European Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2122043","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between local elections and local government budgets. Using dataset of all Macedonian municipalities for the period 2007-2015, this study examines whether the overall spending and the composition of local government expenditures are systematically manipulated just before elections. The results show that spending during the pre-election period shifts toward more desirable categories such as permanent and temporary employment, capital projects, and individual transfers and subsidies. Very few studies relate pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to clientelistic linkages. This paper fills the void by adding empirical evidence from a transitional democracy.