Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations

A. Rusinowska, V. Vergopoulos
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We combine in the same theoretical framework two related phenomena that can be present in organizations – ingratiation of subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards some of their employees. There are three actors in the model: a worker, a manager supervising the worker, and a firm that employs the worker and the manager. Ingratiation is defined as a strategic behavior of the worker to make himself more attractive to the manager. In our model ingratiation is expressed by opinion conformity which is exerted by the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is based on using a bias when reporting to the firm her observation of the worker's performance. First, we determine to optimal level of the effort and the reported opinion of the worker, and the level of bias of the manager. Then, we investigate the effects of favoritism and ingratiation on the expected wages and utilities of the worker and the manager, and on the expected profit of the firm.
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组织中的讨好和偏袒
我们在同一个理论框架中结合了组织中可能存在的两种相关现象——对下属的奉承和上级对某些员工的偏袒。模型中有三个角色:工人、监督工人的经理和雇佣工人和经理的公司。讨好被定义为员工为了使自己对管理者更有吸引力而采取的一种策略行为。在我们的模型中,讨好是通过意见一致性来表达的,这是工人在向经理报告他的意见时施加的。经理的偏袒是基于在向公司报告她对员工表现的观察时使用偏见。首先,我们确定了最优的努力水平和工人的报告意见,以及经理的偏见水平。然后,我们研究了偏袒和讨好对工人和经理的预期工资和效用以及对企业预期利润的影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
8
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