{"title":"Squeeze-Out and Business Valuation in Germany – A Law and Economics Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making","authors":"Florian Follert","doi":"10.1515/AEL-2020-0118","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As an outcome of the scientific conflict within business valuation theory in the German-speaking area, New Political Economy of Business Valuation has developed a possible approach to explain the dissemination of neoclassical valuation concepts in theory and practice. This explanatory model, designed by Quill (2016), is extended by Follert (2020) to include the share valuation in squeeze-out cases for the compensation of minority shareholders. For this purpose, the different actors in the legal mediation procedure (“Spruchverfahren”)—the judge, the auditor as expert, and the conflicting parties—are modeled based on their stereotypical interests. The aim of the present paper is to introduce international scientific community to the scientific conflict between the proponents of investment-theoretical and those of the finance-theoretical conception, and to discuss the role of judicial decision-making from a legal-economic perspective. We would like to illustrate why a judge could benefit from the use of finance-theoretical valuation methods based on the neoclassical capital asset pricing model recommended by the relevant standard (so-called standard 1) of the “Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland IDW” (Institute of Public Auditors in Germany) (“IDW S 1”). The analysis takes a socioeconomic perspective and argues that judicial valuation is primarily influenced by the judges’ tendency to promote their own reputation and by social pressure from their professional environment and different interest groups. This paper adds a further perspective to New Political Economy of Business Valuation. Moreover, the close link between jurisprudence, economics and business economics theory is pointed out. Although the approach presented deals with the squeeze-out under German law, it may be applicable to squeeze-out arrangements in other countries as well, as long as the basic assumptions apply in their legal systems.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/AEL-2020-0118","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract As an outcome of the scientific conflict within business valuation theory in the German-speaking area, New Political Economy of Business Valuation has developed a possible approach to explain the dissemination of neoclassical valuation concepts in theory and practice. This explanatory model, designed by Quill (2016), is extended by Follert (2020) to include the share valuation in squeeze-out cases for the compensation of minority shareholders. For this purpose, the different actors in the legal mediation procedure (“Spruchverfahren”)—the judge, the auditor as expert, and the conflicting parties—are modeled based on their stereotypical interests. The aim of the present paper is to introduce international scientific community to the scientific conflict between the proponents of investment-theoretical and those of the finance-theoretical conception, and to discuss the role of judicial decision-making from a legal-economic perspective. We would like to illustrate why a judge could benefit from the use of finance-theoretical valuation methods based on the neoclassical capital asset pricing model recommended by the relevant standard (so-called standard 1) of the “Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland IDW” (Institute of Public Auditors in Germany) (“IDW S 1”). The analysis takes a socioeconomic perspective and argues that judicial valuation is primarily influenced by the judges’ tendency to promote their own reputation and by social pressure from their professional environment and different interest groups. This paper adds a further perspective to New Political Economy of Business Valuation. Moreover, the close link between jurisprudence, economics and business economics theory is pointed out. Although the approach presented deals with the squeeze-out under German law, it may be applicable to squeeze-out arrangements in other countries as well, as long as the basic assumptions apply in their legal systems.
作为德语区企业价值评估理论内部科学冲突的结果,新企业价值评估政治经济学发展了一种可能的方法来解释新古典价值评估概念在理论和实践中的传播。该解释模型由Quill(2016)设计,Follert(2020)对其进行了扩展,纳入了少数股东补偿挤压案例中的股票估值。为此,法律调解程序中的不同行为者(“Spruchverfahren”)——法官、作为专家的审计员和冲突各方——基于他们的刻板印象的利益进行建模。本文的目的是向国际科学界介绍投资理论支持者和金融理论支持者之间的科学冲突,并从法律经济学的角度讨论司法决策的作用。我们想说明为什么法官可以从使用基于新古典资本资产定价模型的金融理论估值方法中受益,该模型是由“德国公共审计师协会IDW”(“IDW S 1”)的相关标准(所谓的标准1)推荐的。分析从社会经济的角度出发,认为司法评价主要受到法官追求自身声誉的倾向以及来自其职业环境和不同利益群体的社会压力的影响。本文为企业价值评估的新政治经济学提供了一个新的视角。此外,还指出了法理学、经济学和商业经济学理论之间的密切联系。虽然所提出的办法处理的是德国法律规定的“排挤”问题,但只要这些基本假设适用于其他国家的法律制度,它也可能适用于“排挤”安排。