Gettiered Beliefs are Genuine Beliefs

Q2 Arts and Humanities Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme201910219
G. Forrai
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Abstract

In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles.
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有层次的信念是真正的信念
在本刊最近发表的文章中,Benoit Gaultier和John Biro认为,最初的getier案例和与之密切相关的案例都失败了,失败的原因是,这些案例中的主体实际上没有信念,而这种信念可以作为对知识的证明-真实信念分析的反例。他们声称,如果我们的证据与一个特定的个体有关(如在第一种情况下)或与其中一个分离的真理有关(如在第二种情况下),我们就不会真正相信逻辑上遵循的存在概括或分离。我将挑战他们的论点,并提出我们不愿意在这些条件下断言存在概括或分离不是源于缺乏信仰,而是源于实用主义原则。
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来源期刊
Logos and Episteme
Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
期刊最新文献
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