Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap: Implications for Reform Strategy

IF 8.7 1区经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES World Bank Research Observer Pub Date : 2020-08-05 DOI:10.1093/WBRO/LKAA003

M. Stephenson

引用次数: 14

Abstract

Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corrupt...

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来源期刊

World Bank Research Observer Multiple-

CiteScore

12.60

自引率

1.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： The World Bank Journals, including the Research Observer, boast the largest circulation among economics titles. The Research Observer is distributed freely to over 9,100 subscribers in non-OECD countries. Geared towards informing nonspecialist readers about research within and outside the Bank, it covers areas of economics relevant for development policy. Intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists, and educators, its surveys and overviews require only minimal background in economic analysis. Articles are not sent to referees but are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, including distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has around 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.

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