MARKET REGULATION: ARE THERE ANY REASONS TO TREAT SHARING ECONOMY EXCEPTIONALLY?

Abstract

In this paper we posed a question about the role of the state with regard to imposing regulations on the sharing economy sectors. Analysis of the institutional frames of the regulatory intervention of the state in the sharing economy still constitutes an underexploited niche. We drew on the literature in institutional economics and other related fields to provide a picture of a reasonable regulation of markets introduced by a state. The paper covers the spheres of information asymmetry, imperfect competition, negative externalities, and the supply of public goods. What may be generally concluded is that there are no sufficient arguments for treating sharing economy entities more favorably as compared to other organizations. As regards the imperfect competition and negative externalities, sharing economy entities may play a key role and should not be excused from respecting general legal rules. Otherwise, some market actors would use the sharing economy cover just to take advantage of the exemptions. The sharing economy may be also an attractive channel of activity from the perspective of policymakers for mixing direct governmental support with other (social) sources for public goods.