The problem of truth, happiness and self-refutation in the philosophical viewpoint of the world by Pyrrho of Elis

Q4 Arts and Humanities Studia Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-01 DOI:10.5817/sph2019-1-2
A. Kalaš
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Abstract

This paper attempts to explore the concept of truth, human happiness and the related problem of self-refutation in the philosophical viewpoint of the world by Pyrrho of Elis. I argue that according to the so-called metaphysical interpretation of Pyrrho, the reason for our radical incompetence when it comes to knowledge is not our cognitive inability to grasp the truth, but rather the very nature of things of the world. I provide an alternative philosophical interpretation which is based on a philological conjecture in the preserved textual source. I then point out a surprising connection between this radical attitude and the achievement of human happiness, which constitutes the ultimate goal of Pyrrho’s philosophy. Finally, I present a possible solution to the problem of self-refutation, which is in a sense a challenge for radical Pyrrhonian agnosticism. By this paper, I endeavour to show how bizarre could be the image of the world viewed by the prism of radical skepticism of the early Pyrrhonism. Nevertheless, it is a world, wherein the philosopher vindicates his/her eudaimonia and defends the logical consistency of one’s own claims. This publication was made possible through the support of the grant project APVV-18-0103 Paradigmatic changes in the understanding of Universe and Man from philosophical, theological, and physical perspectives.
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以利斯的皮洛哲学世界观中的真理、幸福与自我反驳问题
本文试图探讨伊利斯的皮洛在他的世界哲学观中关于真理、人类幸福的概念及其相关的自我反驳问题。我认为,根据所谓的皮洛的形而上学解释,我们在知识方面根本无能的原因不是我们无法掌握真理的认知能力,而是世界事物的本质。我提供了另一种哲学解释,这是基于保存文本来源的语言学猜想。然后,我指出这种激进的态度与人类幸福的实现之间的惊人联系,而人类幸福构成了皮洛哲学的终极目标。最后,我提出了一个可能的自我反驳问题的解决方案,这在某种意义上是对激进的皮洛尼亚不可知论的挑战。通过这篇文章,我试图表明,在早期皮浪主义激进怀疑主义的棱镜下,世界的形象可能是多么奇怪。然而,这是一个哲学家为他/她的快乐辩护,并捍卫自己主张的逻辑一致性的世界。本出版物是通过资助项目APVV-18-0103的支持,从哲学、神学和物理学的角度理解宇宙和人类的范式变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Studia Philosophica
Studia Philosophica Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
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32 weeks
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