A Hybrid Petroleum Fiscal System for Investment in the Exploration and Production E&P of Hydrocarbon

O. Ogolo, P. Nzerem, I. Okafor, Raji Abubakar, M. Mahmoud, George Kalu
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Abstract

Globally, there are two types of petroleum fiscal system; the concessionary and the contractual petroleum fiscal system. The main differences between the two types of petroleum fiscal system is the ownership of the resources and some distinct fiscal terms. The contractual petroleum fiscal system specifies a cost recovery option and profit oil split unlike the concessionary petroleum fiscal system that allows the contractor to recoup his capital before payment of tax. This tends to increase the risk associated with the host government revenue as investment in the production of hydrocarbon is filled with uncertainties. There is a need to redesign the concessionary petroleum fiscal to enable it reduce the risk associated with the host government revenue by making the host government to earn revenue early from petroleum investment. This research therefore evaluated a hybrid petroleum fiscal system for investment in the exploration and production of hydrocarbon. The concessionary petroleum fiscal system was adjusted to include a cost recovery option. Petroleum economic model for investment in a typical onshore oil field was built using spreadsheet modelling technique with the fiscal terms in the hybrid petroleum fiscal system embedded in it. The cost recovery option and oil price in the model were varied between 0-100% and $20-$100 per barrel. The NCF, IRR and payout period of the investment were determined. It was observed that the lower the cost recovery option, the higher the host government revenue. From the profitability analysis of the investment in the hybrid petroleum fiscal system, it was observed that when the price of oil was $100/bbl, the NCF of the host government was $9146 and $8426.3 for 0% and 80% cost recovery option. The lower the cost recovery option, the higher the payout period and the lower the internal rate of return. Though lower cost recovery increased the host government revenue more but it may make the hybrid petroleum fiscal system unattractive for investment in periods of low oil price. Hence a higher cost recovery option was recommended for the use of this type of petroleum fiscal system.
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油气勘探开发投资的混合财政制度
在全球范围内,有两种类型的石油财政制度;特许和契约式石油财政制度。两种石油财政制度的主要区别在于资源的所有权和一些不同的财政条款。与特许石油财政制度不同,合同石油财政制度规定了成本回收选项和利润分割,特许石油财政制度允许承包商在纳税前收回其资本。这往往会增加东道国政府收入的风险,因为碳氢化合物生产的投资充满了不确定性。有必要重新设计特许石油财政,使东道国政府尽早从石油投资中获得收入,从而降低与东道国政府收入相关的风险。因此,本研究对碳氢化合物勘探和生产投资的混合石油财政制度进行了评价。特许权石油财政制度进行了调整,纳入了成本回收选项。利用电子表格建模技术,将混合石油财政制度中的财政条款嵌入到模型中,建立了典型陆上油田投资的石油经济模型。模型中的成本回收选项和油价在0-100%和20- 100美元/桶之间变化。确定投资的NCF、IRR和派息期。有人指出,成本回收办法越低,东道国政府的收入就越高。从混合石油财政制度投资的盈利能力分析可以看出,当油价为100美元/桶时,在0%和80%成本回收选项下,东道国政府的NCF分别为9146美元和8426.3美元。成本回收选项越低,支付期限越长,内部收益率越低。虽然较低的成本回收增加了东道国政府的收入,但它可能使混合石油财政制度在低油价时期对投资没有吸引力。因此,建议采用成本较高的回收方案来使用这种石油财政系统。
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