Pieter Philippaerts, Yves Younan, Stijn Muylle, F. Piessens, Sven Lachmund, T. Walter
{"title":"CPM: Masking Code Pointers to Prevent Code Injection Attacks","authors":"Pieter Philippaerts, Yves Younan, Stijn Muylle, F. Piessens, Sven Lachmund, T. Walter","doi":"10.1145/2487222.2487223","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Code Pointer Masking (CPM) is a novel countermeasure against code injection attacks on native code. By enforcing the correct semantics of code pointers, CPM thwarts attacks that modify code pointers to divert the application’s control flow. It does not rely on secret values such as stack canaries and protects against attacks that are not addressed by state-of-the-art countermeasures of similar performance. This article reports on two prototype implementations on very distinct processor architectures, showing that the idea behind CPM is portable. The evaluation also shows that the overhead of using our countermeasure is very small and the security benefits are substantial.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":"2 1","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"23","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2487222.2487223","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q","JCRName":"Engineering","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Abstract
Code Pointer Masking (CPM) is a novel countermeasure against code injection attacks on native code. By enforcing the correct semantics of code pointers, CPM thwarts attacks that modify code pointers to divert the application’s control flow. It does not rely on secret values such as stack canaries and protects against attacks that are not addressed by state-of-the-art countermeasures of similar performance. This article reports on two prototype implementations on very distinct processor architectures, showing that the idea behind CPM is portable. The evaluation also shows that the overhead of using our countermeasure is very small and the security benefits are substantial.
期刊介绍:
ISSEC is a scholarly, scientific journal that publishes original research papers in all areas of information and system security, including technologies, systems, applications, and policies.