The hold-up problem in China's broiler industry: Empirical evidence from Jiangsu Province

Abstract

Using detailed survey data on broiler growers, we tested for the existence of hold-up problems in the broiler industry in Jiangsu Province, China. We found that growers’ investments in chicken houses, which are assets with a high degree of physical and location specificity, increased along with the number of potential buyers (integrators) nearby. Such an effect was particularly strong in proximity to leading industry buyers. These results support the existence of hold-ups in the Chinese broiler industry. However, we failed to find evidence that a longer-term contract led to higher grower investments in chicken houses, possibly because of the lack of a minimum purchase guarantee in a typical contract. A key policy implication of this study is that subsidies to growers, from the government or buyers, can alleviate the underinvestment problem caused by hold-ups.