Why did China's cost-reduction-oriented policies in food safety governance fail? The collective action dilemma perspective

Abstract

Consumer participation plays an important role in improving food safety. Current research shows that reducing associated costs can promote consumer participation; however, the cost-reduction-oriented policies adopted by the Chinese government has had little impact on consumer participation. This study explores the reasons for the failure of the Chinese cost-reduction-oriented policies in food safety governance from the perspective of the collective action dilemma. Building upon previous work and using data from an online survey of 1229 consumers in China, we use a mediating effect model to examine the causal relationship between the low participation rate and the high participation cost. The results suggest that low consumer participation in food safety governance is due to free-riding built on the actions of others. The problem with the cost-reduction-oriented policies is that they addressed high participation costs, identified by this study as the consequence of non-participation, but paid little attention to the actual cause – free-riding. Our research sheds light on the collective action dilemma from a new perspective to understand consumer participation. Assessing the relationship between participation cost, free-riding, and the actual participation behavior in food safety governance could lead to a new line of theoretical and empirical inquiry for studying collective action in public affairs.