Sinners or Saints? Top Underwriters, Venture Capitalists, and IPO Underpricing

Kose John, A. Knyazeva, D. Knyazeva
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper examines strategic interactions between venture capitalists (VCs) and top underwriters in the IPO process. We test two contrasting hypotheses: certification and rent extraction. On the one hand, the joint involvement of VCs and top underwriters can amplify their certification effect, reducing IPO underpricing. On the other hand, the rent extraction incentives of VCs and top underwriters, particularly in a repeated dealing context, can increase underpricing. We test these contrasting effects on IPO underpricing in the cross-section and around two regulatory shocks. First, VC-backed IPOs, VC-backed deals with top underwriters, and deals with stronger VC-underwriter ties exhibit greater underpricing. The cross-sectional results continue to hold in two-stage least squares estimation with geographical instruments. Second, the 2012 JOBS Act decreased disclosures by issuers and increased informational asymmetry. We find that IPO underpricing increased among VC-backed IPOs involving top underwriters after the JOBS Act. Third, a 2003 NASD rule limited explicit rents that may be extracted from preferential allocations of new IPO issues. We find that VC-backed IPO underpricing declined after the shock, and the effect was concentrated among VC-backed deals involving top underwriters and VCs with ties to underwriters. Importantly, we find no effect of top underwriters alone unless a VC is also involved. The observed decline in IPO underpricing cannot be explained by analyst involvement or the passage of Regulation FD. Moreover, repeat dealing between large institutions and underwriters similarly increases underpricing, but the effect does not explain the role of VC-underwriter ties and does not decline after the 2003 shock. Overall, our results support rent extraction, shed new light on the effects of VC backing, underwriters, and institutions on IPO underpricing, and emphasize the role of strategic interactions between them in the post-dot-com period.
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罪人还是圣徒?顶级承销商、风险投资家和IPO定价过低
本文考察了风险资本家与顶级承销商在IPO过程中的战略互动。我们检验了两个截然不同的假设:认证和租金提取。一方面,风投和顶级承销商的共同参与可以放大他们的认证效应,减少IPO的低定价。另一方面,风投和顶级承销商的租金提取激励,特别是在重复交易的背景下,可能会加剧定价过低。我们在横截面和两种监管冲击下测试了这些对IPO抑价的不同影响。首先,风投支持的ipo、风投支持的与顶级承销商的交易,以及与更强的风投承销商关系的交易,都表现出更大的定价低估。横截面结果继续适用于地理工具的两阶段最小二乘估计。其次,2012年JOBS法案减少了发行人的披露,增加了信息不对称。我们发现,在《就业法案》实施后,在由顶级承销商参与的风投支持的IPO中,IPO定价偏低的情况有所增加。第三,2003年NASD的一项规定限制了可能从新股优先分配中提取的明确租金。我们发现,风险投资支持的IPO抑价在冲击后有所下降,且影响主要集中在涉及顶级承销商和与承销商有联系的风险投资支持的交易中。重要的是,我们发现顶级承销商没有单独的影响,除非风险投资也参与其中。观察到的IPO低定价的下降不能用分析师的参与或FD条例的通过来解释。此外,大型机构和承销商之间的重复交易同样会增加定价过低,但这种效应并不能解释风投承销商关系的作用,而且在2003年的冲击之后也没有下降。总体而言,我们的研究结果支持租金提取,揭示了风险投资支持、承销商和机构对IPO定价过低的影响,并强调了后互联网时代它们之间战略互动的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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