The Role of Feelings in the Cognition of Values in the Perspective of Hermeneutic Philosophy (Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor)

Abstract

The Role of Feelings in the Cognition of Values in the Perspective of Hermeneutic Philosophy(Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor) The article discusses the role of feelings in the process of the cognition of values in the perspective of hermeneutic philosophy, and – more specifically – in the light of the works by two major representatives of this current: Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor. Despite many differences, both philosophers share the interest in the role of feelings in the process of self-interpretation and in the importance of individual moral choices. In hermeneutic philosophy, more significance is usually attributed to reason than to feelings, which makes the investigation of the role that feelings play in the process of the cognition of values and their importance in the space of interpersonal relations particularly interesting. The context of the present considerations is that of the crisis of institutional forms of social trust and therewith associated ethical principles. The author of the article analyzes the possibility of creating an ethics based on values, yet an ethics critical of institutional forms of behavior and the formalized rules of conduct developed for the purposes of the organizations.