{"title":"Group Gender Diversity, Individual Power and Influence, and Collective Risk-Taking","authors":"K. Wabara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3940001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using the multiple Emmy Award-winning television game show, Cash Cab, as a pseudo-laboratory, we find that the presence (or addition) of one powerful or influential female in (or to) a small (previously homogeneous male) group significantly reduces the group’s willingness to take qualitatively excessive financial risks. If, however, a group (of at least three persons) consists of one such female, adding more females does not significantly alter the risk-taking behavior of the group. Overall, our results show that an individual’s or a subgroup’s share of power and influence, not just numerical strength, determines whether their tendencies (e.g., relative risk-taking behavior) manifest in collective decisions/outcomes. Our findings have external implications for studies in other settings (e.g., the corporate board).","PeriodicalId":8731,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Finance eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Behavioral & Experimental Finance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3940001","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Using the multiple Emmy Award-winning television game show, Cash Cab, as a pseudo-laboratory, we find that the presence (or addition) of one powerful or influential female in (or to) a small (previously homogeneous male) group significantly reduces the group’s willingness to take qualitatively excessive financial risks. If, however, a group (of at least three persons) consists of one such female, adding more females does not significantly alter the risk-taking behavior of the group. Overall, our results show that an individual’s or a subgroup’s share of power and influence, not just numerical strength, determines whether their tendencies (e.g., relative risk-taking behavior) manifest in collective decisions/outcomes. Our findings have external implications for studies in other settings (e.g., the corporate board).