Cost Allocation for Less-Than-Truckload Collaboration via Shipper Consortium

Minghui Lai, Xiaoqiang Cai, Nicholas G. Hall
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

We study the problem of collaborative less-than-truckload (LTL) transportation in the form of a shipper consortium, which is operated by a third-party logistics provider (3PL) through a cross-dock/pooling network. The 3PL has responsibility for planning the combined loads prior to actual shipments, hiring and routing carriers to execute shipping, and allocating the cost to the shippers in the consortium. Shippers receive substantial cost savings from combined truckload shipments. However, achieving consolidation and realizing this benefit requires addressing two essential issues: (i) how to find an approximately optimal consolidation solution in a large network with many freights and (ii) how to determine a fair cost allocation rule among the shippers’ consolidated freights that ensures budget balance while minimally violating coalitional stability. Our work resolves these two issues. We formulate a time-space network flow model of the problem under both incremental and all-unit discount structures of LTL rates and propose a computationally efficient algorithm based on local search heuristics. We model the problem of allocating cost to the shippers as a cooperative game. We decompose and linearize the Lagrangian dual problem by using total unimodularity and concavity. We propose an efficiently computable cost allocation rule from the linearized dual models. The dual rule ensures stable cooperation but may have underallocation equal to a duality gap. To cover the underallocation, we further develop a budget covering procedure and define an [Formula: see text]-core allocation with desirable properties. Through extensive computational experiments, we find that the shipper consortium reduces total shipping costs by more than 40% in most cases; meanwhile, the [Formula: see text]-core allocation is typically in the core for small-scale networks while violating stability by at most 5% for large-scale networks and provides consolidated freights with more than 50% individual cost savings on average.
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通过托运人联盟实现少载货合作的成本分配
我们研究了由第三方物流供应商(3PL)通过交叉码头/池化网络,以托运人联盟的形式进行的协作小货车(LTL)运输问题。第三方物流公司负责在实际发货前规划组合负载,雇用和路由承运人来执行运输,并将成本分配给财团中的托运人。托运人从联合卡车运输中获得大量的成本节约。然而,实现合并和实现这一利益需要解决两个基本问题:(i)如何在具有许多货物的大型网络中找到近似最优的合并解决方案;(ii)如何在托运人合并货物之间确定公平的成本分配规则,以确保预算平衡,同时最小限度地违反联盟稳定性。我们的工作解决了这两个问题。我们建立了LTL利率增量和全单位折扣结构下问题的时空网络流模型,并提出了一种基于局部搜索启发式的计算效率高的算法。我们将托运人的成本分配问题建模为合作博弈。利用全单模性和凹性对拉格朗日对偶问题进行了分解和线性化。从线性化的对偶模型出发,提出了一种高效可计算的成本分配规则。二元规则保证了稳定的合作,但可能存在分配不足,即二元差距。为了弥补分配不足,我们进一步开发了一个预算覆盖程序,并定义了一个具有理想属性的核心分配。通过大量的计算实验,我们发现托运人联盟在大多数情况下降低了40%以上的总运输成本;同时,[公式:见文]-核心分配通常在小规模网络的核心,而在大规模网络中最多违反5%的稳定性,并提供合并货运平均节省50%以上的个人成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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