{"title":"Constitutional and Other Persons","authors":"G. Bradley","doi":"10.5840/QD20155221","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Roe v. Wade2 the Supreme Court affirmed three propositions about the status of unborn children as human persons. The first proposition was that the unborn are not constitutional persons. The Court asserted that the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn (156). This conclusion was important because, as the Court plainly stated, the case for abortion liberty would otherwise, “collapse..., for the fetus’s right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment” (156–67). The Court concluded, more specifically, that if the unborn were recognized as constitutional persons, only abortions to save a pregnant woman’s life could be consistent with equal respect for the life of the unborn.3 Writing for the Roe Court, Justice Blackmun treated the constitutional-person question as one about past legal usage, as an inquiry about a technical term whose meaning in Roe depended upon how it was understood in the nineteenth century. He considered just two kinds of historical evidence","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quaestiones Disputatae","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155221","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Roe v. Wade2 the Supreme Court affirmed three propositions about the status of unborn children as human persons. The first proposition was that the unborn are not constitutional persons. The Court asserted that the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn (156). This conclusion was important because, as the Court plainly stated, the case for abortion liberty would otherwise, “collapse..., for the fetus’s right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment” (156–67). The Court concluded, more specifically, that if the unborn were recognized as constitutional persons, only abortions to save a pregnant woman’s life could be consistent with equal respect for the life of the unborn.3 Writing for the Roe Court, Justice Blackmun treated the constitutional-person question as one about past legal usage, as an inquiry about a technical term whose meaning in Roe depended upon how it was understood in the nineteenth century. He considered just two kinds of historical evidence
在罗伊诉韦德案(Roe v. wade)中,最高法院确认了关于未出生婴儿作为人的地位的三项主张。第一个主张是未出生的人不是宪法规定的人。最高法院断言,第十四修正案中使用的“人”一词不包括未出生的胎儿(156)。这一结论很重要,因为正如最高法院明确指出的那样,否则堕胎自由的情况将“崩溃……,因为胎儿的生命权将得到修正案的具体保障”(156-67)。法院的结论更具体地说,如果未出生的人被承认为宪法人,只有为挽救孕妇的生命而堕胎才符合对未出生者生命的平等尊重布莱克蒙法官在为罗伊案法院撰写的意见书中,将宪法人问题视为一个关于过去法律用法的问题,作为一个关于一个技术术语的问题,这个术语在罗伊案中的含义取决于19世纪对它的理解。他只考虑了两种历史证据