{"title":"Critique in the Age of Indifference","authors":"Iain M. Mackenzie","doi":"10.1353/tae.2022.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In After Finitude, Meillassoux asks an epoch-defining question: how can we criticize both ideological dogmatism and skeptical fanaticism if the rise of skeptical fanaticism is an effect of the Kantian critical philosophy one must employ against ideological dogmatism? Meillassoux's answer is to argue in favor of thought's ability to access the absolute necessity of contingency. Agamben and Laruelle give an alternative answer. Although very different in style and argument, both aim to disqualify fanatical positions by showing how \"the belief that belief is all there is\" is not all there is because of the contingent nature of thought about the real. I will argue that while pursuing logics of disqualification, all three thinkers nonetheless employ arguments that render positive claims that sit uncomfortably within their respective systems. The upshot is that the transcendental gesture of critical philosophy—what are the conditions of our positive claims about thought and the world—is halted by an uncritical appeal to the condition of all conditions; intellectual intuition in Meillassoux and an indifferent thought/real in Agamben and Laruelle. But what options remain, given that the problem of critique in an age of indifference is a problem that critical philosophy itself has created? The task, I will argue, is to express the transcendental conditions of what we know about the world and how we know what we know about the world in a manner that retains the contingency of both. But are there variants of contemporary thought that can express the contingency of the real and of thought while remaining within the transcendental apparatus providing the necessary criteria for the challenge of both ideological dogmatism and skeptical fanaticism? I shall bring the argument to a close by suggesting that two such variants are available—transcendental naturalism and transcendental aestheticism—and that the latter provides a secure but non-dogmatic ground for critique in an age of indifference.","PeriodicalId":55174,"journal":{"name":"Discrete Event Dynamic Systems-Theory and Applications","volume":"229 1","pages":"47 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Discrete Event Dynamic Systems-Theory and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2022.0003","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract:In After Finitude, Meillassoux asks an epoch-defining question: how can we criticize both ideological dogmatism and skeptical fanaticism if the rise of skeptical fanaticism is an effect of the Kantian critical philosophy one must employ against ideological dogmatism? Meillassoux's answer is to argue in favor of thought's ability to access the absolute necessity of contingency. Agamben and Laruelle give an alternative answer. Although very different in style and argument, both aim to disqualify fanatical positions by showing how "the belief that belief is all there is" is not all there is because of the contingent nature of thought about the real. I will argue that while pursuing logics of disqualification, all three thinkers nonetheless employ arguments that render positive claims that sit uncomfortably within their respective systems. The upshot is that the transcendental gesture of critical philosophy—what are the conditions of our positive claims about thought and the world—is halted by an uncritical appeal to the condition of all conditions; intellectual intuition in Meillassoux and an indifferent thought/real in Agamben and Laruelle. But what options remain, given that the problem of critique in an age of indifference is a problem that critical philosophy itself has created? The task, I will argue, is to express the transcendental conditions of what we know about the world and how we know what we know about the world in a manner that retains the contingency of both. But are there variants of contemporary thought that can express the contingency of the real and of thought while remaining within the transcendental apparatus providing the necessary criteria for the challenge of both ideological dogmatism and skeptical fanaticism? I shall bring the argument to a close by suggesting that two such variants are available—transcendental naturalism and transcendental aestheticism—and that the latter provides a secure but non-dogmatic ground for critique in an age of indifference.
期刊介绍:
The research on discrete event dynamic systems (DEDSs) is multi-disciplinary in nature and its development has been dynamic. Examples of DEDSs include manufacturing plants, communication networks, computer systems, management information databases, logistics systems, command-control-communication systems, robotics, and other man-made operational systems. The state processes of such systems cannot be described by differential equations in general. The aim of this journal, Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications, is to publish high-quality, peer-reviewed papers on the modeling and control of, and all other aspects related to, DEDSs. In particular, the journal publishes papers dealing with general theories and methodologies of DEDSs and their applications to any particular subject, including hybrid systems, as well as papers discussing practical problems from which some generally applicable DEDS theories or methodologies can be formulated; The scope of this journal is defined by its emphasis on discrete events and the dynamic nature of the systems and on their modeling, control and optimization.