{"title":"Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Turing Machines with Unbounded Memory","authors":"Venkata Koppula, Allison Bishop, Brent Waters","doi":"10.1145/2746539.2746614","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show how to build indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) for Turing Machines where the overhead is polynomial in the security parameter λ, machine description |M| and input size |x| (with only a negligible correctness error). In particular, we avoid growing polynomially with the maximum space of a computation. Our construction is based on iO for circuits, one way functions and injective pseudo random generators. Our results are based on new \"selective enforcement\" techniques. Here we first create a primitive called positional accumulators that allows for a small commitment to a much larger storage. The commitment is unconditionally sound for a select piece of the storage. This primitive serves as an \"iO-friendly\" tool that allows us to make two different programs equivalent at different stages of a proof. The pieces of storage that are selected depend on what hybrid stage we are at in a proof. We first build up our enforcement ideas in a simpler context of \"message hiding encodings\" and work our way up to indistinguishability obfuscation.","PeriodicalId":20566,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"130","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746539.2746614","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 130
Abstract
We show how to build indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) for Turing Machines where the overhead is polynomial in the security parameter λ, machine description |M| and input size |x| (with only a negligible correctness error). In particular, we avoid growing polynomially with the maximum space of a computation. Our construction is based on iO for circuits, one way functions and injective pseudo random generators. Our results are based on new "selective enforcement" techniques. Here we first create a primitive called positional accumulators that allows for a small commitment to a much larger storage. The commitment is unconditionally sound for a select piece of the storage. This primitive serves as an "iO-friendly" tool that allows us to make two different programs equivalent at different stages of a proof. The pieces of storage that are selected depend on what hybrid stage we are at in a proof. We first build up our enforcement ideas in a simpler context of "message hiding encodings" and work our way up to indistinguishability obfuscation.