Informed intermediaries

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.3982/te4072
P. Onuchic
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.
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通知中介
我发展了一种市场中介理论,在这种市场中,代理人双边会面进行交易,买家不能承诺付款。一些经纪人观察市场上交易者过去的交易历史。这些知情的代理人可以通过惩罚之前违约的交易者来确保交易的安全。惩罚策略影响均衡价格,并决定哪些交易受到违约风险的阻碍。中介是一种稳健的均衡特征,由不对称惩罚策略产生,这种策略要么使知情的代理人获得更有效的交易机会,要么使他们有能力在交易中获取更多盈余。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
35
审稿时长
52 weeks
期刊介绍: Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index
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