M. Bugeja, Raymond da Silva Rosa, H. Izan, Susan Ngan
{"title":"Choice of Acquisition Form in Australia and the Post‐Takeover Employment of Target Firm Directors on the Acquiring Firm Board","authors":"M. Bugeja, Raymond da Silva Rosa, H. Izan, Susan Ngan","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12307","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be structured as either a scheme of arrangement or a takeover. We investigate the association between deal structure and the retention of target directors on the merged entity board. We find that the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entity's board are significantly higher in schemes. The results also show that premiums are lower in schemes of arrangement when additional target directors are appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. The findings indicate that target director appointment is unrelated to the merged entity's post-acquisition performance.","PeriodicalId":23644,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12307","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be structured as either a scheme of arrangement or a takeover. We investigate the association between deal structure and the retention of target directors on the merged entity board. We find that the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entity's board are significantly higher in schemes. The results also show that premiums are lower in schemes of arrangement when additional target directors are appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. The findings indicate that target director appointment is unrelated to the merged entity's post-acquisition performance.