Agency Choice of Policymaking Form

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2003-12-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.476562
M. Magill
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引用次数: 26

Abstract

An administrative agency delegated some task - protect the environment, assure the integrity of the securities markets, improve auto safety - might carry out that obligation by adopting a rule, bringing or deciding a case, or announcing its interpretation of the statute. Although agencies are unique institutions in this respect, this state of affairs generates little comment. This Article aims to rectify that by identifying, evaluating, and coming to terms with the phenomenon of agency choice of policymaking form. That phenomenon can be simply stated: The typical administrative agency is authorized to use a range of distinct policymaking forms to effectuate its statutory mandate and its choice about which tool to rely on appears, at first glance at least, to be unregulated by courts. Part I of the Article will discuss the policymaking tools that statutes and case law typically make available, the significance of the choice among them, and the varying choices that agencies make. Part II takes up the judicial reaction to agency choices of procedure. That judicial reaction, at least at first blush, can be simply described: hands-off. An agency can choose among its available policymaking tools and a court will not require it to provide an explanation for its choice. This judicial reaction is perplexing because it is out of step with the rest of the law of judicial review of agency action. This Part examines possible reasons why courts might treat agency choices of procedure differently than other exercises of discretion, but dismisses each of them as implausible. After setting forth this puzzle in the structure of the law, this Part offers an explanation for it. That explanation is rooted in the fact that courts have a surprising degree of control over the consequences of an agency's choice of form. By adjusting the consequences of choosing one form or another, courts have the opportunity to respond to whatever concerns they might have about an agency's choice. Courts thus review agency choices of procedure, albeit in a roundabout way. Parts I and II are devoted to identifying and analyzing the phenomenon of agency choice of policymaking form. That task is the main object of the Article because these features of administrative law and practice are not now considered worthy of notice. After noticing them, though, the next step is to come to terms with them. Part III of the Article starts that task.
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决策机构选择表
一个行政机构被授予某些任务——保护环境,确保证券市场的完整性,提高汽车安全——可以通过制定一项规则,提起或裁决一个案件,或宣布其对法规的解释来履行这项义务。虽然机构在这方面是独特的机构,但这种情况很少引起评论。本文旨在通过对决策形式的代理选择现象的识别、评价和妥协来纠正这一现象。这种现象可以简单地说:典型的行政机构被授权使用一系列不同的决策形式来实现其法定授权,而它对依赖哪种工具的选择,至少乍一看,似乎不受法院的管制。文章的第一部分将讨论成文法和判例法通常提供的决策工具,其中选择的意义,以及机构做出的不同选择。第二部分是对代理程序选择的司法反应。司法部门的反应,至少乍一看,可以简单地描述为:不干涉。一个机构可以在其可用的决策工具中进行选择,法院不会要求它为其选择提供解释。这种司法反应令人困惑,因为它与司法审查机关行为的其他法律不一致。本部分探讨了法院可能将代理程序选择与其他自由裁量权行使区别对待的可能原因,但将其中每一种都视为不合理而不予考虑。在阐述了法律结构中的这一困惑之后,本部分对其进行了解释。这种解释的根源在于,法院对行政机关选择诉讼形式的后果有着令人惊讶的控制。通过调整选择一种或另一种形式的后果,法院有机会回应他们对机构选择的任何担忧。法院因此审查机关的程序选择,尽管是以一种迂回的方式。第一部分和第二部分对决策形式的代理选择现象进行了识别和分析。这一任务是本条款的主要目的,因为行政法和行政实践的这些特点现在被认为不值得注意。然而,注意到它们之后,下一步就是与它们妥协。本文的第三部分开始了这一任务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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