Extending Exclusivity for Biopharmaceuticals to Deter Competing Generics: A Review of Strategies, Potential Mitigation, and Similarities to Infringement

IF 0.7 Q3 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES Technology and Innovation Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI:10.21300/21.3.2020.215
C. Phelps
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Abstract

Some patents confront infringement—unauthorized use of the inventions in the patent—thus violating the exclusive use intent of the U.S. Constitution's creation of the patent system to encourage innovation. In other situations, the reverse occurs—patent holders seek to extend their exclusivity period to prevent competitive entrants. This commonly occurs in biopharmaceutical products markets, where annual revenues on many patented drugs exceed $1 billion per year and (most importantly) where several pathways allow extension of exclusivity. This paper reviews the relevant legislation (Bayh-Dole Act, Orphan Drug Act, Hatch-Waxman Act, and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization Act) as well as the safety and efficacy regulations of the FDA that control marketing of biopharmaceutical products. The paper then assesses methods used to extend patent exclusivity—some legal, some clearly illegal, and some with ambiguous legal status—in order to deter generic entrants. These methods include using FDA "citizen's petitions," creating generic equivalents of branded drugs to block other generic entrants, deterring potential generic competitors from gaining samples to prove bioequivalence to original formulations, seeking additional patents to extend exclusivity (sometimes for trivial changes), paying potential entrants to delay entry, subdividing the potential patient population to qualify for extensions granted by "orphan drug" status, and (most recently) selling patents to Native American tribes to prevent challenges to their validity. The paper concludes by discussing remedies—primarily legislative—that could either eliminate these actions and/or clarify their legality. Then follows a comparison between these entry-delaying strategies and patent infringement itself.
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延长生物制药专有权以阻止竞争仿制药:策略、潜在缓解和侵权相似之处的回顾
有些专利面临侵权——未经授权使用专利中的发明——因此违反了美国宪法为鼓励创新而建立专利制度的独占使用意图。在其他情况下,情况正好相反——专利持有人试图延长其独占期,以阻止有竞争力的进入者。这通常发生在生物制药产品市场,其中许多专利药物的年收入超过每年10亿美元,而且(最重要的是)有几种途径允许延长专有权。本文回顾了相关立法(Bayh-Dole法案、Orphan Drug法案、Hatch-Waxman法案和FDA现代化法案)以及FDA控制生物制药产品上市的安全性和有效性法规。然后,论文评估了用于延长专利独占性的方法——有些是合法的,有些显然是非法的,还有一些具有模糊的法律地位——以阻止仿制药进入者。这些方法包括使用FDA的“公民请愿”,创建品牌药的仿制药以阻止其他仿制药进入者,阻止潜在的仿制药竞争对手获得样品以证明与原始配方的生物等效性,寻求额外的专利以延长排他性(有时是微不足道的变化),付钱给潜在的进入者以延迟进入,细分潜在的患者群体以获得“孤儿药”地位授予的延长资格。以及(最近)向美洲土著部落出售专利,以防止对其有效性的挑战。本文最后讨论了补救措施——主要是立法——可以消除这些行为和/或澄清其合法性。然后将这些延迟进入策略与专利侵权本身进行比较。
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来源期刊
Technology and Innovation
Technology and Innovation MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES-
自引率
20.00%
发文量
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