The Political Question Doctrines

John C. Harrison
{"title":"The Political Question Doctrines","authors":"John C. Harrison","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2667634","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Much that is said about the political question doctrine is wrong. Commentators, lower courts, and sometimes the Supreme Court in its dicta err about the holding, reasoning, and underlying rationale of the Court’s cases that have applied it. The doctrine as the Supreme Court has developed it in those cases is not a limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is, however, a limit on the judicial power in its relations with political power. The doctrine has two branches. In one, courts treat as conclusive certain decisions by political actors that apply legal principles to particular facts. The leading example is recognition of states and governments, as to which the courts are bound by non-judicial decisions. In the other branch, the mandatory remedies that courts may give are limited in the extent to which they may direct political actors with respect to highly sensitive discretionary decisions, mainly those involving military and security matters. The doctrine’s rationale is that in some unusual circumstances the law commits final decision of a legal question to a non-judicial decision maker, as with Senate impeachment trials, and that the distinction between judicial and political power implies some limits on the extent to which the courts can command the exercise of the latter. Some Justices have identified substantive legal rules that under certain circumstances are not susceptible of judicial enforcement because such enforcement would require the courts to make political judgments, but the Court has not decided any case on that basis. The doctrine has in the past been broader than it is today. In some earlier cases, the Court found that the vindication of certain interests connected to political sovereignty was beyond judicial power, and the limits on directive remedies were tighter in the past than they are now. A substantial number of lower court decisions have seriously misunderstood the doctrine by treating it as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction. In the name of the political question doctrine, lower courts have refused to reach the merits of claims, especially damages claims against executive officers and government contractors related to national-security decisions, on grounds that have no foundation in the Court's doctrine or Article III.","PeriodicalId":80193,"journal":{"name":"The American University law review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The American University law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2667634","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

Much that is said about the political question doctrine is wrong. Commentators, lower courts, and sometimes the Supreme Court in its dicta err about the holding, reasoning, and underlying rationale of the Court’s cases that have applied it. The doctrine as the Supreme Court has developed it in those cases is not a limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is, however, a limit on the judicial power in its relations with political power. The doctrine has two branches. In one, courts treat as conclusive certain decisions by political actors that apply legal principles to particular facts. The leading example is recognition of states and governments, as to which the courts are bound by non-judicial decisions. In the other branch, the mandatory remedies that courts may give are limited in the extent to which they may direct political actors with respect to highly sensitive discretionary decisions, mainly those involving military and security matters. The doctrine’s rationale is that in some unusual circumstances the law commits final decision of a legal question to a non-judicial decision maker, as with Senate impeachment trials, and that the distinction between judicial and political power implies some limits on the extent to which the courts can command the exercise of the latter. Some Justices have identified substantive legal rules that under certain circumstances are not susceptible of judicial enforcement because such enforcement would require the courts to make political judgments, but the Court has not decided any case on that basis. The doctrine has in the past been broader than it is today. In some earlier cases, the Court found that the vindication of certain interests connected to political sovereignty was beyond judicial power, and the limits on directive remedies were tighter in the past than they are now. A substantial number of lower court decisions have seriously misunderstood the doctrine by treating it as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction. In the name of the political question doctrine, lower courts have refused to reach the merits of claims, especially damages claims against executive officers and government contractors related to national-security decisions, on grounds that have no foundation in the Court's doctrine or Article III.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
政治问题学说
关于政治问题主义的许多说法都是错误的。评论人士、下级法院,有时还有最高法院,在其裁决中,对法院适用该裁决的案件的裁定、推理和基本理由都存在错误。最高法院在这些案件中形成的原则并不是对联邦法院的主体管辖权的限制。然而,在司法权与政治权力的关系中,它是一种限制。该学说有两个分支。其一,法院将政治行为者将法律原则应用于特定事实的某些决定视为结论性决定。最主要的例子是对国家和政府的承认,法院在这方面受非司法裁决的约束。在另一个方面,法院可能给予的强制性补救在指导政治行为者就高度敏感的酌情决定,主要是那些涉及军事和安全事项的决定的程度上是有限的。该原则的基本原理是,在一些不寻常的情况下,法律将法律问题的最终决定权交给非司法决策者,如参议院弹劾审判,司法权力和政治权力之间的区别意味着法院可以在一定程度上限制后者的行使。一些法官指出,在某些情况下,实体法规则不容易受到司法执行的影响,因为这种执行需要法院作出政治判断,但法院没有在此基础上对任何案件作出裁决。这一原则在过去比现在更为广泛。在一些较早的案件中,法院发现,与政治主权有关的某些利益的辩护超出了司法权的范围,过去对指示补救的限制比现在更严格。相当数量的下级法院判决严重误解了这一原则,将其视为对标的管辖权的限制。在政治问题原则的名义下,下级法院以在法院的原则或第三条中没有基础的理由,拒绝达成索赔的实质,特别是针对行政官员和政府承包商的与国家安全决定有关的损害赔偿索赔。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
CHAPTER 2. Research Universities: Overextended, Underfocused; Overstressed, Underfunded The American University National Treasure or Endangered Species? CHAPTER 7. Prospect for the Social Sciences in the Land Grant University The American University: Dilemmas and Directions Frontmatter
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1