Arthur Azevedo de Amorim, Nathan Collins, A. DeHon, Delphine Demange, Catalin Hritcu, David Pichardie, B. Pierce, R. Pollack, A. Tolmach
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引用次数: 86
Abstract
SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and flexible propagation and combination of tags as instructions are executed. The operating system virtualizes these generic facilities to present an information-flow abstract machine that allows user programs to label sensitive data with rich confidentiality policies. We present a formal, machine-checked model of the key hardware and software mechanisms used to control information flow in SAFE and an end-to-end proof of noninterference for this model.
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