{"title":"Military Intelligence: Ill-Defined and Understudied","authors":"Alessandro Scheffler, Jan Dietrich","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2187190","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite being centrally important, military intelligence remains understudied and undertheorized. This negligence stems partly from its unclear definition and the difficult differentiation between “civilian” and “military” intelligence. The available official definitions serve instrumental purposes rather than compelling lines of reasoning and reflect the complex and heterogeneous structure of national military intelligence architectures. By using classical intelligence studies approaches, it is possible to get a better understanding of the various ways in which military intelligence can be defined. But such an approach must be complemented by an appreciation of five classic points of “bureaucratic contention” that influence how states define the role of military intelligence within their wider Intelligence Community. These are divided mandates, adequate warfighter support, consistency of national intelligence assessments, intellectual independence and rigor within military intelligence, and the optimal organization and integration of military expertise.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"24 1","pages":"1047 - 1066"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2187190","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract Despite being centrally important, military intelligence remains understudied and undertheorized. This negligence stems partly from its unclear definition and the difficult differentiation between “civilian” and “military” intelligence. The available official definitions serve instrumental purposes rather than compelling lines of reasoning and reflect the complex and heterogeneous structure of national military intelligence architectures. By using classical intelligence studies approaches, it is possible to get a better understanding of the various ways in which military intelligence can be defined. But such an approach must be complemented by an appreciation of five classic points of “bureaucratic contention” that influence how states define the role of military intelligence within their wider Intelligence Community. These are divided mandates, adequate warfighter support, consistency of national intelligence assessments, intellectual independence and rigor within military intelligence, and the optimal organization and integration of military expertise.