CanDID: Can-Do Decentralized Identity with Legacy Compatibility, Sybil-Resistance, and Accountability

Deepak Maram, Harjasleen Malvai, Fan Zhang, Nerla Jean-Louis, Alexander Frolov, T. Kell, Tyrone Lobban, Christine Moy, A. Juels, Andrew K. Miller, ‡UIUC, §J, P. Morgan
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引用次数: 58

Abstract

We present CanDID, a platform for practical, user-friendly realization of decentralized identity, the idea of empowering end users with management of their own credentials.While decentralized identity promises to give users greater control over their private data, it burdens users with management of private keys, creating a significant risk of key loss. Existing and proposed approaches also presume the spontaneous availability of a credential-issuance ecosystem, creating a bootstrapping problem. They also omit essential functionality, like resistance to Sybil attacks and the ability to detect misbehaving or sanctioned users while preserving user privacy.CanDID addresses these challenges by issuing credentials in a user-friendly way that draws securely and privately on data from existing, unmodified web service providers. Such legacy compatibility similarly enables CanDID users to leverage their existing online accounts for recovery of lost keys. Using a decentralized committee of nodes, CanDID provides strong confidentiality for user’s keys, real-world identities, and data, yet prevents users from spawning multiple identities and allows identification (and blacklisting) of sanctioned users.We present the CanDID architecture and report on experiments demonstrating its practical performance.
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坦率:具有遗产兼容性、抗sybil和问责性的Can-Do分散身份
我们提出了CanDID,一个实用的,用户友好的去中心化身份实现平台,授权最终用户管理自己的凭据。虽然去中心化身份可以让用户更好地控制他们的私人数据,但它给用户带来了管理私钥的负担,造成了密钥丢失的重大风险。现有的和提议的方法还假定凭据发行生态系统的自发可用性,从而产生了一个引导问题。它们还忽略了一些基本功能,比如抵抗Sybil攻击,以及在保护用户隐私的同时检测行为不端或受到制裁的用户的能力。CanDID以一种用户友好的方式颁发凭据,以安全和私密的方式从现有的、未修改的web服务提供商获取数据,从而解决了这些挑战。这种遗留兼容性同样使CanDID用户能够利用他们现有的在线帐户来恢复丢失的密钥。通过使用分散的节点委员会,CanDID为用户的密钥、真实世界的身份和数据提供了强大的机密性,同时防止用户产生多个身份,并允许对受制裁的用户进行识别(和黑名单)。我们提出了CanDID架构,并报告了实验证明其实际性能。
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