Closing the gaps in the regulation of submarine cables: lessons from the Australian experience*

Abstract

ABSTRACT Submarine cables are vital to the global economy and the national security of States. While their importance and role in transmitting most of the world's data and communications is increasingly being recognised by States, the legal regime governing submarine cables is often characterised as a neglected area of the law the sea. The security implications arising from an intentional attack on international submarine cables cannot be underestimated. Despite the significant security risks and vulnerabilities, the legal regime governing submarine cables is limited and there are a number of crucial gaps in the regulation of submarine cables. This article examines the existing legal options available to States to close the ‘security gap’ using the Australian experience as a case study. A number of respected commentators in this area have argued that the best way to close the security gap in the regulation of submarine cables would be to develop a new counter–terrorism convention to criminalise the intentional damage of international submarine cables. This article reflects on whether additional legal options are necessary or available to effectively close these gaps given the institutional, legal and political context surrounding the ‘orphan’ of international law: submarine cables.