Clientelismo personalizado en Colombia: una aproximación histórico-institucional a un estudio de caso

Abstract

Much of the political science literature regards clientelism as harmful to democracies. To a lesser extent, other approaches estimate that clientelism is a mechanism that meets the needs of vulnerable populations. This article aims to contribute to knowledge built on this theme through a case study. It seeks to: 1) show how clientelism works, taking the municipality of Barranquilla, Colombia, as a reference; 2) propose explanations to grasp the clientelist rationale; and 3) investigate its effects on the democratic regime. From a historical-institutional perspective, we argue that clientelism in Barranquilla has a personalistic rather than a partisan nature, as a result of political arrangements and institutional changes that have taken place in Colombia since the mid-20 century. Evidence allows us to claim that clientelist politics has allowed the local economic-political elites to perpetuate in power and that the asymmetries between rulers and ruled persist.