Threshold Password-Hardened Encryption Services

Julian Brost, Christoph Egger, Russell W. F. Lai, Fritz Schmid, Dominique Schröder, M. Zoppelt
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Password-hardened encryption (PHE) was introduced by Lai et al. at USENIX 2018 and immediately productized by VirgilSecurity. PHE is a password-based key derivation protocol that involves an oblivious external crypto service for key derivation. The security of PHE protects against offline brute-force attacks, even when the attacker is given the entire database. Furthermore, the crypto service neither learns the derived key nor the password. PHE supports key-rotation meaning that both the server and crypto service can update their keys without involving the user. While PHE significantly strengthens data security, it introduces a single point of failure because key-derivation always requires access to the crypto service. In this work, we address this issue and simultaneously increase security by introducing threshold password-hardened encryption. Our formalization of this primitive revealed shortcomings of the original PHE definition that we also address in this work. Following the spirit of prior works, we give a simple and efficient construction using lightweight tools only. We also implement our construction and evaluate its efficiency. Our experiments confirm the practical efficiency of our scheme and show that it is more efficient than common memory-hard functions, such as scrypt. From a practical perspective this means that threshold PHE can be used as an alternative to scrypt for password protection and key-derivation, offering better security in terms of offline brute force attacks.
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阈值密码强化加密服务
密码强化加密(PHE)由Lai等人在USENIX 2018上提出,并立即由VirgilSecurity生产。PHE是一种基于密码的密钥派生协议,它涉及用于密钥派生的无关外部加密服务。PHE的安全性可以防止离线暴力攻击,即使攻击者获得了整个数据库。此外,加密服务既不学习派生密钥,也不学习密码。PHE支持密钥轮换,这意味着服务器和加密服务都可以在不涉及用户的情况下更新密钥。虽然PHE显着增强了数据安全性,但它引入了单点故障,因为密钥派生总是需要访问加密服务。在这项工作中,我们解决了这个问题,同时通过引入阈值密码强化加密来提高安全性。我们对这个原语的形式化揭示了我们在这项工作中也解决的原始PHE定义的缺点。遵循之前作品的精神,我们只使用轻量级工具进行简单高效的施工。我们也实施我们的建设和评估其效率。实验验证了该方案的实际有效性,并表明它比常见的内存硬函数(如script)效率更高。从实际的角度来看,这意味着阈值PHE可以用作密码保护和密钥派生脚本的替代方案,在离线暴力攻击方面提供更好的安全性。
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Session details: Session 1D: Applied Cryptography and Cryptanalysis HACLxN: Verified Generic SIMD Crypto (for all your favourite platforms) Pointproofs: Aggregating Proofs for Multiple Vector Commitments Session details: Session 4D: Distributed Protocols A Performant, Misuse-Resistant API for Primality Testing
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