China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons

Q1 Social Sciences Asian Security Pub Date : 2021-12-20 DOI:10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654
Tong Zhao
{"title":"China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons","authors":"Tong Zhao","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China’s practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries’ potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China’s NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists’ expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called “lower the nuclear coercion threshold” operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy’s applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China’s practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries’ potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China’s NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists’ expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called “lower the nuclear coercion threshold” operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy’s applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
中国与不首先使用核武器的国际辩论
中国是世界上唯一奉行无条件不首先使用核武器政策的核国家。中国这一政策的实践及其对国际安全的影响对围绕NFU的国际辩论具有重要意义,并为其他国家对NFU的潜在考虑提供了信息。NFU政策能否带来减少核武器作用、遏制核军备竞争和减轻核扩散风险的预期好处,取决于其他国家对此类政策的可信度。本文考察了一些可能影响中国NFU政策可信度的内部挑战。其中之一是,中国军事战略家表示有兴趣通过所谓的“降低核胁迫门槛”行动,在特定条件下的常规冲突中威胁使用核武器。其他问题还包括,中国体制中缺乏确保NFU实施的制度约束,以及由于新技术的发展,NFU政策在具体情况下的适用性越来越模糊。本文就中国如何应对这些挑战以及如何与其他国家合作为国际上采用《无核武器条约》创造条件提出了建议,包括如何解决无核武器国家对常规层面安全后果的担忧。报告最后讨论了中国和其他有核国家如何通过加强现有的无核武器政策和更广泛地推广可信的无核武器政策来更好地履行其裁军义务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
Asian Security
Asian Security Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
期刊最新文献
Redefining NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships: cooperative security meets collective defence and deterrence Political regimes and self-reliance in the Indian arms industry Sailing close to the wind: Japan’s forward deterrence posture toward the Taiwan Strait A neoclassical realist analysis of the evolving Philippines–India defense partnership in the twenty-first century The dragon in central Asia: Is China’s increased economic involvement resulting in security gains?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1