How Common are Dominated Health Plan Options? Evidence from Employer Health Benefits with High-Deductible Plans

Chenyuan Liu, Justin R. Sydnor
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Abstract

We analyze detailed data on plan designs from the Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Benefits Survey for 331 firms that offered employees both a qualifying high-deductible health plan and a lower-deductible option. For an employee at these firms selecting the lower-deductible option will decrease the deductible by $1,300 on average. However, the cost of that additional coverage for the employee, from increased employee premiums and forgone firm contributions to health savings accounts, is nearly as large, averaging $1,100. In 65% of firms the high-deductible option would result in lower maximum possible spending for the employee for the year. Further, we estimate based on simplified plan representations that the high-deductible plan financially dominates the lower-deductible option for employees at roughly half of the firms. Employees facing a range of possible medical-spending distributions would save on average over $500 per year with the high-deductible option, often with no additional annual financial risk. While we cannot pin down the mechanism behind these patterns conclusively, the evidence is consistent with firms passing through lower average costs for high-deductible plans generated by adverse selection patterns to the employees choosing those plans. These results raise questions about the net effect of offering employees choices over plans with different coverage levels. Rather than creating a classic trade-off between risk and expected spending, at many firms plan options generate disparities in overall benefit value for employees who opt into different levels of coverage.
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主导健康计划有多普遍?来自高免赔额计划的雇主健康福利证据
我们分析了来自凯撒家庭基金会雇主健康福利调查的331家公司的详细数据,这些公司为员工提供了合格的高免赔额健康计划和低免赔额选择。对于这些公司的雇员来说,选择免赔额较低的选项将使免赔额平均减少1300美元。然而,员工的额外保险成本(包括增加的员工保费和放弃对健康储蓄账户的公司缴款)几乎同样高,平均为1,100美元。在65%的公司中,高免赔额的选择会降低员工当年的最大可能支出。此外,我们根据简化的计划表示估计,在大约一半的公司中,高免赔额计划在财务上主导了员工的低免赔额选择。如果选择高免赔额方案,面临一系列可能的医疗支出分配的员工平均每年将节省500多美元,而且通常没有额外的年度财务风险。虽然我们不能最终确定这些模式背后的机制,但有证据表明,公司通过逆向选择模式产生的高免赔额计划的较低平均成本,来激励选择这些计划的员工。这些结果提出了一个问题,即为员工提供不同覆盖水平的计划选择的净效应。许多公司并没有在风险和预期支出之间建立一种典型的权衡,而是对选择不同保险等级的员工产生了总体利益价值的差异。
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