Regspraak: Rei vindicatio teenoor terughoudingsbevoegdhede – ’n allegaartjie van verwarring

J. Sonnekus
{"title":"Regspraak: Rei vindicatio teenoor terughoudingsbevoegdhede – ’n allegaartjie van verwarring","authors":"J. Sonnekus","doi":"10.47348/tsar/2023/i3a13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Some judgments do not instil confidence in the mastery of the legal principles that should have been applied. This is one. The rei vindicatio is the primary remedy for the owner who is reclaiming possession of his property from the defendant. The latter is at litis contestatio in control of the object of the claimant’s ownership. The claimant only needs to prove that he is the owner of the thing in question and that the defendant is currently in control of it – ie it is still in esse as an independent thing. It is not necessary for the claimant to prove that the defendant is in unjustified or illegal possession of the thing. If the defendant does want to rely on an alleged legal justification for his control over the object, then the onus is on him to prove it. In this matter, the bank as applicant alleges that it is the owner of a 2016 Hilux vehicle which is currently in control of the first respondent, a panel beater with some salvage interest as a towing service. The bank provided credit to the second respondent for the purchase of the vehicle in July 2016. However, despite the fact that the latter was in control of the vehicle as tenant for the bank as owner, the bank retained ownership over the vehicle until the last instalment had been paid. Because the ownership of the bank was not contested, the bank was not required to indicate how it had attained ownership over the vehicle. In general, banks do not partake in the sale of vehicles but merely finance the acquisition; in this matter it is not self-evident how the bank had acquired the ownership and by way of which derivative mode of acquisition. The vehicle was towed by the panel beaters a week after the second respondent had taken delivery of the vehicle in question. It had been standing on the premises of the first respondent for almost seven years and it had been exposed to all the elements – it had thus depreciated daily. The second respondent had since defaulted on all his instalment obligations and his liability had increased monthly with the compound interest due. According to the acting judge, it seemed that the second respondent had abandoned the motor vehicle with no intention to pay. Only the holder of a right can abandon it, and at no point in time did the second respondent acquire ownership of this Hilux. Under the credit agreement, his liabilities cannot be unilaterally abandoned either – apparently abandonment does not come into play at all. Notwithstanding numerous requests by the bank to allow it to repossess the vehicle, the first respondent relied on an alleged lien to justify its continued possession. The so-called lien is alleged to be founded on either a tacit agreement or a salvage lien. Not only is it clear that no agreement ever existed between the bank as owner and the panel beater – irrespective of whether the second respondent, as alleged, had agreed to the tow-in service – but a lien can never be founded on an agreement. A lien is no pledge, and in the absence of a real agreement, no limited real right is acquired by the retentor as lien holder, even when all the requirements for a lien had been satisfied. In this case, none of the requirements for a lien had been met. Any agreement between the second and the first respondent in July 2016 would be res inter alios acta as far as the bank is concerned and such agreement cannot bind the bank as owner. Because the bank is contractually entitled to repossess its property without any damage from the buyer as tenant if the latter has defaulted (as in this case since 2016) the bank as owner cannot be enriched by any prolonged retention of its property by the panel beaters – it may only be impoverished. Notwithstanding the jumble of confusion uttered in the judgment, the court came to the correct decision and ordered the immediate release of the vehicle to the bank. In the process, the acting judge botched the relevant legal principles and even mixed-up the identification of the parties involved in this matter to the extent that this judgment does not encourage trust in the judiciary. Furthermore, the judgment should have been edited and proofread by the acting judge before it was posted and published on SAFLII – unfortunately the editing was badly done. In many instances, the reader cannot even guess what the acting judge intended to say. In the final formulation of the order, the second respondent, who was not even in court, was ordered to return the Hilux to the bank forthwith – although it had been standing on the premises of the panel beaters for almost seven years and was clearly not in possession of the second respondent – and the same second respondent was ordered to pay the cost of the suit. A court does have a discretion to compel a retentor to accept alternative security in the form of a guaranteed amount to cover any realistic proven claim, but in the meantime to discharge the object of the lien to the owner. Once the lien holder has fully quantified and proven his claim, he will be entitled to payment in respect of the improvements or safekeeping regarding the object of the lien to the lesser of either his impoverishment sine causa or the owner’s unjustified enrichment, if applicable. As soon as sufficient security has been tendered by the owner, the lien holder has no basis to continue retaining possession of the property and should discharge it to the owner. Although the bank, in this matter, offered to provide a guarantee that a realistic amount would be available to pay any proven claim by the panel beaters in a subsequent action against the bank, the court order does not refer to it at all, leaving the impression that no guarantee was ordered. It is submitted that, although this fact is not motivated in any sense by the acting judge, it was correct given the circumstances. No claim can be proven by the panel beaters against the bank founded on unjustified enrichment or the actio negotiorum gestorum as action resulting from the unauthorised management of the affairs of another. Due to the fact that the requirement of accessority was not met, there was no room to entertain a lien. Consequently, no guarantee to replace or discharge the unjustified lien could come into play.","PeriodicalId":53590,"journal":{"name":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Tydskrif Vir Die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.47348/tsar/2023/i3a13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Some judgments do not instil confidence in the mastery of the legal principles that should have been applied. This is one. The rei vindicatio is the primary remedy for the owner who is reclaiming possession of his property from the defendant. The latter is at litis contestatio in control of the object of the claimant’s ownership. The claimant only needs to prove that he is the owner of the thing in question and that the defendant is currently in control of it – ie it is still in esse as an independent thing. It is not necessary for the claimant to prove that the defendant is in unjustified or illegal possession of the thing. If the defendant does want to rely on an alleged legal justification for his control over the object, then the onus is on him to prove it. In this matter, the bank as applicant alleges that it is the owner of a 2016 Hilux vehicle which is currently in control of the first respondent, a panel beater with some salvage interest as a towing service. The bank provided credit to the second respondent for the purchase of the vehicle in July 2016. However, despite the fact that the latter was in control of the vehicle as tenant for the bank as owner, the bank retained ownership over the vehicle until the last instalment had been paid. Because the ownership of the bank was not contested, the bank was not required to indicate how it had attained ownership over the vehicle. In general, banks do not partake in the sale of vehicles but merely finance the acquisition; in this matter it is not self-evident how the bank had acquired the ownership and by way of which derivative mode of acquisition. The vehicle was towed by the panel beaters a week after the second respondent had taken delivery of the vehicle in question. It had been standing on the premises of the first respondent for almost seven years and it had been exposed to all the elements – it had thus depreciated daily. The second respondent had since defaulted on all his instalment obligations and his liability had increased monthly with the compound interest due. According to the acting judge, it seemed that the second respondent had abandoned the motor vehicle with no intention to pay. Only the holder of a right can abandon it, and at no point in time did the second respondent acquire ownership of this Hilux. Under the credit agreement, his liabilities cannot be unilaterally abandoned either – apparently abandonment does not come into play at all. Notwithstanding numerous requests by the bank to allow it to repossess the vehicle, the first respondent relied on an alleged lien to justify its continued possession. The so-called lien is alleged to be founded on either a tacit agreement or a salvage lien. Not only is it clear that no agreement ever existed between the bank as owner and the panel beater – irrespective of whether the second respondent, as alleged, had agreed to the tow-in service – but a lien can never be founded on an agreement. A lien is no pledge, and in the absence of a real agreement, no limited real right is acquired by the retentor as lien holder, even when all the requirements for a lien had been satisfied. In this case, none of the requirements for a lien had been met. Any agreement between the second and the first respondent in July 2016 would be res inter alios acta as far as the bank is concerned and such agreement cannot bind the bank as owner. Because the bank is contractually entitled to repossess its property without any damage from the buyer as tenant if the latter has defaulted (as in this case since 2016) the bank as owner cannot be enriched by any prolonged retention of its property by the panel beaters – it may only be impoverished. Notwithstanding the jumble of confusion uttered in the judgment, the court came to the correct decision and ordered the immediate release of the vehicle to the bank. In the process, the acting judge botched the relevant legal principles and even mixed-up the identification of the parties involved in this matter to the extent that this judgment does not encourage trust in the judiciary. Furthermore, the judgment should have been edited and proofread by the acting judge before it was posted and published on SAFLII – unfortunately the editing was badly done. In many instances, the reader cannot even guess what the acting judge intended to say. In the final formulation of the order, the second respondent, who was not even in court, was ordered to return the Hilux to the bank forthwith – although it had been standing on the premises of the panel beaters for almost seven years and was clearly not in possession of the second respondent – and the same second respondent was ordered to pay the cost of the suit. A court does have a discretion to compel a retentor to accept alternative security in the form of a guaranteed amount to cover any realistic proven claim, but in the meantime to discharge the object of the lien to the owner. Once the lien holder has fully quantified and proven his claim, he will be entitled to payment in respect of the improvements or safekeeping regarding the object of the lien to the lesser of either his impoverishment sine causa or the owner’s unjustified enrichment, if applicable. As soon as sufficient security has been tendered by the owner, the lien holder has no basis to continue retaining possession of the property and should discharge it to the owner. Although the bank, in this matter, offered to provide a guarantee that a realistic amount would be available to pay any proven claim by the panel beaters in a subsequent action against the bank, the court order does not refer to it at all, leaving the impression that no guarantee was ordered. It is submitted that, although this fact is not motivated in any sense by the acting judge, it was correct given the circumstances. No claim can be proven by the panel beaters against the bank founded on unjustified enrichment or the actio negotiorum gestorum as action resulting from the unauthorised management of the affairs of another. Due to the fact that the requirement of accessority was not met, there was no room to entertain a lien. Consequently, no guarantee to replace or discharge the unjustified lien could come into play.
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有些判决不能使人对掌握本应适用的法律原则产生信心。这是一个。重新辩护是业主从被告手中收回其财产的主要救济手段。后者是对索赔人所拥有的客体进行控制的诉讼。索赔人只需要证明他是有关物品的所有者,而被告目前控制着该物品,即该物品仍然作为一个独立的物品存在。索赔人没有必要证明被告不合理或非法占有该物品。如果被告确实想依靠所谓的法律理由来控制该物品,那么他就有责任证明这一点。在这个问题上,作为申请人的银行声称,它是一辆2016年Hilux车辆的所有者,该车辆目前由第一被告控制,该被告是一家面板殴打公司,作为牵引服务公司获得了一些救助利益。该银行于2016年7月向第二被告提供贷款,用于购买该车。然而,尽管银行作为所有人而银行作为承租人控制车辆,但银行保留对车辆的所有权,直到支付最后一期付款为止。由于银行的所有权不存在争议,因此不要求银行说明它是如何取得对该工具的所有权的。一般来说,银行不参与汽车的销售,而只是为收购提供融资;在这个问题上,银行是如何取得所有权的,以及通过何种派生的取得方式并不是不言自明的。该车是在第二个答辩人收到该车一周后被殴打者拖走的。它在第一个被告的房中存放了将近七年,受到了各种因素的影响,因此每天都在贬值。自那以后,第二位答辩人拖欠了他的所有分期付款义务,他的负债随着应付复利逐月增加。根据代理法官的说法,似乎第二个被告放弃了机动车,并没有打算付款。只有权利持有人才能放弃它,而第二被告在任何时间点上都没有获得该希勒克斯的所有权。根据信贷协议,他的债务也不能单方面放弃——显然放弃根本不起作用。尽管银行多次请求允许其收回车辆,但第一被告依靠所谓的留置权来证明其继续占有的合理性。所谓留置权,据称是建立在一个默契或救助留置权。不仅很明显,作为所有者的银行与陪审团殴打者之间从未存在任何协议——无论第二被告是否如所指控的那样同意拖入服务——而且留置权永远不能建立在协议之上。留置权不是质押,在没有真实协议的情况下,即使留置权的所有条件都已满足,留置权人作为留置权人也不能取得有限的物权。在这种情况下,留置权的任何条件都没有得到满足。就银行而言,第二被申请人和第一被申请人在2016年7月达成的任何协议都将是相互之间的行为,该协议对作为所有者的银行不具有约束力。因为根据合同,如果买方违约(如2016年以来的这种情况),银行有权收回其作为承租人的财产,而不会对买方造成任何损害,因此,作为业主的银行不能因为面板殴打者长期保留其财产而变得富有——它可能只会变得贫穷。尽管判决中出现了混乱,法院还是做出了正确的决定,下令立即将车辆归还给银行。在这个过程中,代理法官搞砸了相关的法律原则,甚至混淆了当事人的身份,以至于这一判决不鼓励对司法的信任。此外,判决书在SAFLII上发表之前,应该由代理法官进行编辑和校对,不幸的是,编辑工作做得很糟糕。在许多情况下,读者甚至猜不出代理法官想说什么。在最后制定命令时,甚至不在法庭上的第二个被告被命令立即将Hilux归还银行- -尽管它已经在小组殴打者的房舍中放置了将近7年,而且显然不是第二个被告的财产- -并且同一个第二个被告被命令支付诉讼费用。法院有裁量权强迫承租人接受以保证金额形式的替代担保,以覆盖任何实际证明的索赔,但同时向所有人解除留置权的客体。 有些判决不能使人对掌握本应适用的法律原则产生信心。这是一个。重新辩护是业主从被告手中收回其财产的主要救济手段。后者是对索赔人所拥有的客体进行控制的诉讼。索赔人只需要证明他是有关物品的所有者,而被告目前控制着该物品,即该物品仍然作为一个独立的物品存在。索赔人没有必要证明被告不合理或非法占有该物品。如果被告确实想依靠所谓的法律理由来控制该物品,那么他就有责任证明这一点。在这个问题上,作为申请人的银行声称,它是一辆2016年Hilux车辆的所有者,该车辆目前由第一被告控制,该被告是一家面板殴打公司,作为牵引服务公司获得了一些救助利益。该银行于2016年7月向第二被告提供贷款,用于购买该车。然而,尽管银行作为所有人而银行作为承租人控制车辆,但银行保留对车辆的所有权,直到支付最后一期付款为止。由于银行的所有权不存在争议,因此不要求银行说明它是如何取得对该工具的所有权的。一般来说,银行不参与汽车的销售,而只是为收购提供融资;在这个问题上,银行是如何取得所有权的,以及通过何种派生的取得方式并不是不言自明的。该车是在第二个答辩人收到该车一周后被殴打者拖走的。它在第一个被告的房中存放了将近七年,受到了各种因素的影响,因此每天都在贬值。自那以后,第二位答辩人拖欠了他的所有分期付款义务,他的负债随着应付复利逐月增加。根据代理法官的说法,似乎第二个被告放弃了机动车,并没有打算付款。只有权利持有人才能放弃它,而第二被告在任何时间点上都没有获得该希勒克斯的所有权。根据信贷协议,他的债务也不能单方面放弃——显然放弃根本不起作用。尽管银行多次请求允许其收回车辆,但第一被告依靠所谓的留置权来证明其继续占有的合理性。所谓留置权,据称是建立在一个默契或救助留置权。不仅很明显,作为所有者的银行与陪审团殴打者之间从未存在任何协议——无论第二被告是否如所指控的那样同意拖入服务——而且留置权永远不能建立在协议之上。留置权不是质押,在没有真实协议的情况下,即使留置权的所有条件都已满足,留置权人作为留置权人也不能取得有限的物权。在这种情况下,留置权的任何条件都没有得到满足。就银行而言,第二被申请人和第一被申请人在2016年7月达成的任何协议都将是相互之间的行为,该协议对作为所有者的银行不具有约束力。因为根据合同,如果买方违约(如2016年以来的这种情况),银行有权收回其作为承租人的财产,而不会对买方造成任何损害,因此,作为业主的银行不能因为面板殴打者长期保留其财产而变得富有——它可能只会变得贫穷。尽管判决中出现了混乱,法院还是做出了正确的决定,下令立即将车辆归还给银行。在这个过程中,代理法官搞砸了相关的法律原则,甚至混淆了当事人的身份,以至于这一判决不鼓励对司法的信任。此外,判决书在SAFLII上发表之前,应该由代理法官进行编辑和校对,不幸的是,编辑工作做得很糟糕。在许多情况下,读者甚至猜不出代理法官想说什么。在最后制定命令时,甚至不在法庭上的第二个被告被命令立即将Hilux归还银行- -尽管它已经在小组殴打者的房舍中放置了将近7年,而且显然不是第二个被告的财产- -并且同一个第二个被告被命令支付诉讼费用。法院有裁量权强迫承租人接受以保证金额形式的替代担保,以覆盖任何实际证明的索赔,但同时向所有人解除留置权的客体。 一旦留置权持有人完全量化并证明了他的主张,他将有权获得关于留置权对象的改进或保管的付款,以他因原因而贫困或所有者不合理的致富(如果适用)中较小者为准。一旦业主提供了足够的担保,留置权人就没有理由继续保留对财产的占有,并应将其解除给业主。虽然在这个问题上,银行提出保证,将提供一笔实际的数额,以支付小组殴打者在随后对银行提起的诉讼中提出的任何经证实的索赔,但法院命令根本没有提到它,给人留下一种没有下令保证的印象。有人认为,虽然这一事实在任何意义上都不是代理法官的动机,但鉴于当时的情况,这是正确的。专家组成员无法证明对银行提出的索赔是基于不合理的敛财或因未经授权管理他人事务而产生的无协商地行为。由于取得要件的条件未得到满足,就没有留置权的余地。因此,没有保证取代或解除不合理的留置权可以发挥作用。 一旦留置权持有人完全量化并证明了他的主张,他将有权获得关于留置权对象的改进或保管的付款,以他因原因而贫困或所有者不合理的致富(如果适用)中较小者为准。一旦业主提供了足够的担保,留置权人就没有理由继续保留对财产的占有,并应将其解除给业主。虽然在这个问题上,银行提出保证,将提供一笔实际的数额,以支付小组殴打者在随后对银行提起的诉讼中提出的任何经证实的索赔,但法院命令根本没有提到它,给人留下一种没有下令保证的印象。有人认为,虽然这一事实在任何意义上都不是代理法官的动机,但鉴于当时的情况,这是正确的。专家组成员无法证明对银行提出的索赔是基于不合理的敛财或因未经授权管理他人事务而产生的无协商地行为。由于取得要件的条件未得到满足,就没有留置权的余地。因此,没有保证取代或解除不合理的留置权可以发挥作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
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期刊介绍: This multilingual periodical is published quarterly by Juta for the Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg. This scholarly and practical journal covers a broad spectrum of topics pertinent to the legal community.
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