Blockchain-Driven Supply Chain's Financing and Coordination Strategy under Nash Bargaining Scheme

Abstract

Blockchain-driven supply chain finance (SCF) has become an emerging supply chain financing mode. Compared with the traditional SCF mode, blockchain-driven SCF can shorten the transaction process and provide real trade data that cannot be tampered with, thereby improving the efficiency of capital operation. This article explores the financing and coordination problems of a blockchain-driven supply chain. Based on the three most common supply chain contracts (revenue-sharing contract, profit-sharing contract, and two-part tariff contract), we construct a comparative model of bank credit financing (BCF) and blockchain-driven SCF, discuss the optimal decision-making strategy of the supply chain, and quantitatively analyze the performance of supply chain under each mode. The results show the following: (i) there is a threshold for the usage rate of the blockchain-driven SCF platform; (ii) only when the platform usage rate is lower than the threshold, the blockchain-driven SCF mode which benefits both manufacturer and retailer is a better choice; (iii) the above results always hold if supply chain contracts can coordinate the supply chain in terms of quantity decisions; (iv) the blockchain-driven SCF mode is more efficient for supply chains which are less capital-constrained. This article provides a decision basis for the selection of supply chain financing channels and provides an idea for future research on blockchain-driven SCF.