On the Rationality of Team Reasoning and Some of its Normative Implications

Abstract

Theories of team reasoning in game theory build on the assumption that best-reply reasoning is not the only reasoning mode agents may endorse. Instead, they may make choice on the basis of team preferences and/or as participants in a mutually beneficial practice. This paper reflects on the way to account for the rationality of endorsing team reasoning in a strategic decision problem. I focus on the particular issue of the rationality of making choice on the basis of team reasoning rather than other reasoning modes. I argue that the endorsement of team reasoning in specific contexts can be interpreted as a commitment that can be rationally assessed from an agent-subjective perspective. This necessitates making a distinction between preferences, conceived as individual interests, and values, defined as broader motivations and reasons to act. I suggest that this account of the rationality of team reasoning has significant normative implications, in particular regarding the relevance of standard welfare economics.