{"title":"Different Rationales of Coalition Formation and Incentives for Strategic Voting","authors":"Eric Linhart, Johannes Raabe","doi":"10.4236/am.2018.97058","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Research on strategic voting has mainly focused on electoral system effects but \nlargely neglected the impact of different rationales of coalition formation. Based \non a formal model of rational party choice and a simulation study, we systematically \ninvestigate this impact and explore the implications. We show that the \nlogic of the underlying coalition formation procedure clearly affects the degree \nto which the electorate is exposed to strategic incentives regarding the vote \nchoice. The key implications are that sincere voting is more often in the voter’s \nbest interest if parties are policy-seeking and if there is increased uncertainty \nduring the stage of coalition formation. Furthermore, we explore how \ndifferent types of coalition formation affect strategic incentives across the policy \nspace.","PeriodicalId":55568,"journal":{"name":"Applied Mathematics-A Journal of Chinese Universities Series B","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Applied Mathematics-A Journal of Chinese Universities Series B","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4236/am.2018.97058","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Research on strategic voting has mainly focused on electoral system effects but
largely neglected the impact of different rationales of coalition formation. Based
on a formal model of rational party choice and a simulation study, we systematically
investigate this impact and explore the implications. We show that the
logic of the underlying coalition formation procedure clearly affects the degree
to which the electorate is exposed to strategic incentives regarding the vote
choice. The key implications are that sincere voting is more often in the voter’s
best interest if parties are policy-seeking and if there is increased uncertainty
during the stage of coalition formation. Furthermore, we explore how
different types of coalition formation affect strategic incentives across the policy
space.
期刊介绍：
Applied Mathematics promotes the integration of mathematics with other scientific disciplines, expanding its fields of study and promoting the development of relevant interdisciplinary subjects.
The journal mainly publishes original research papers that apply mathematical concepts, theories and methods to other subjects such as physics, chemistry, biology, information science, energy, environmental science, economics, and finance. In addition, it also reports the latest developments and trends in which mathematics interacts with other disciplines. Readers include professors and students, professionals in applied mathematics, and engineers at research institutes and in industry.
Applied Mathematics - A Journal of Chinese Universities has been an English-language quarterly since 1993. The English edition, abbreviated as Series B, has different contents than this Chinese edition, Series A.
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