The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”

Q2 Arts and Humanities Logos and Episteme Pub Date : 2019-12-17 DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme201910438
Xintong Wei
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Many philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has been argued that the obligation norm is jointly incompatible with the maxim ought implies can and the assumption that there exists some truth that we cannot believe. The problem of the incompatible triad has motivated some to adopt the permissible norm of truth. I argue that the permissible norm faces an analogous problem of the incompatible triad.
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真理的允许规范与“应该即可以”
许多哲学家认为,真理的规范支配着信仰的命题态度。根据一种流行的规范性解释,规范性本质上是规定性的。规定性规范既可以用义务也可以用许可来表述:一个人应该或者可以相信p,只是在p为真的情况下。有人认为,义务规范与“应当即能”这一准则以及存在某些我们不能相信的真理的假设是共同不相容的。不相容的三合一的问题促使一些人采用了可允许的真理标准。我认为允许规范面临着一个类似于不相容三位一体的问题。
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来源期刊
Logos and Episteme
Logos and Episteme Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊介绍: the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
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