The Actuality of the Movable (by the Mover): a Relational Interpretation of Aristotle’s Definition of Motion

Abstract

Abstract The paper discusses Aristotle’s conception of motion and proposes a new perspective for a reading. Of course, motion can be located between two states of a movable, between potentiality and actuality, but it can also be located between (the state of) a movable and (that of) its mover. It is also argued that this relational perspective is the correct way to understand Aristotle’s definition of motion. When Aristotle defines motion as “the actuality of what potentially is, qua such” he does not simply mean that motion is “the actuality of the movable”: by being the actuality of the movable “qua movable”, motion is also the actuality of the mover. Indeed, in its proper meaning, ‘movable’ does not refer to a per se entity. Instead it is a relative term, always standing for “movable by the mover”; the qua-clause is intended to stress this relational aspect.