Is There Any Virtue in Offsetting?

Abstract

Do we have a strong reason to offset even if offsetting is morally inefficient? Some philosophers – such as John Broome – argue that justice-based climate duties require us to contribute money to offsetting even if we could actualize a greater good by funding more effective charities (Stefansson 2022, 226). H. Orri Stefánsson’s meticulous dissection of this type of reasoning convincingly concludes that ‘we have not yet seen an argument’ (Stefansson 2022, 237) that effectively delivers strong moral reasons to offset. While I agree with Stefánsson’s general point, I suggest that his focus on consequentialist assumptions of such reasoning (Stefansson 2022, 226) and possible deontic responses to his criticisms (Stefansson 2022, 233) overlooks the possibility that virtue theory might provide a better way to ethically support offsetting. More specifically, I propose to explore food choices in particular, and how virtue theory’s emphasis on habituation might provide moral reason to offset. We should begin by noting that our actions affect others and the environment that we all share in a myriad of ways. The precise causal chains connecting our lives are often difficult to detect – especially when it involves indirect associations. Making moral judgments is seemingly intractable in the best of circumstances. When complicated causal issues entangle with further complex issues of responsibility, one might be tempted to throw in the towel. But we need not give in to such temptation. As Aristotle observed (Nic. Eth. 1.3) we should not expect exactness in fields such as ethics or political philosophy – or, we might add today, environmental ethics. Stefánsson’s paper provides perspicuous and persuasive philosophical reasoning about the morality of offsetting while recognizing the Aristotelian point that we should not anticipate precise quantitative models of the complicated causal mechanisms involved. Although Stefánsson grants that these debates involve issues that are ‘highly uncertain’ (Stefansson 2022, 228) and relationships that are ‘probabilistic’ (Stefansson 2022, 231), he judiciously finds enough commonality with his opponents to debate the issues fruitfully. Stefánsson concentrates on the simple example that one can achieve a greater amount of good by donating to a charity that combats malaria than a charity that offsets one’s carbon emissions. As previously noted, of course, many philosophers argue that because previous emissions have caused harm, justice requires that this harm be remedied. Stefánsson counters cogently that offsetting almost always fails to help those who may have been wronged by previous actions, making it difficult to see how